

NÚMERO 262

CHAD KIEWIET DE JONGE

**Who lies about electoral gifts?
Experimental evidence from Latin America**



Importante

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Abstract

While political campaigns commonly employ clientelistic mobilization tactics during elections in developing countries, studying vote buying with surveys has proven difficult for researchers since respondents often will not admit to receiving a gift or favor in exchange for their votes. This paper explores the degree to which different demographic and political groups vary in their degree of truthfulness with regard to vote buying using list experiments included in 10 original surveys conducted in eight Latin American countries. The analysis demonstrates the widespread prevalence of underreporting and also shows that two different sources of question sensitivity best predict underreporting of vote buying across countries. First, due to greater awareness and internalization of norms against vote buying among the most educated respondents, social desirability bias is positively associated with education. Second, since vote buying is often stigmatized as resulting from poverty, those who are particularly sensitive to questions about income also prove to be much more likely to edit their answers.

Keywords: Vote buying, clientelism, social desirability bias, Latin America, list experiments

Resumen

Aunque campañas políticas con frecuencia emplean tácticas de movilización clientelista durante elecciones en países en desarrollo, estudiando la compra de votos con encuestas ha resultado difícil para investigadores porque los entrevistados frecuentemente no admiten recibir un regalo o favor en cambio de sus votos. Este artículo explora la medida en que diferentes grupos demográficos y políticos varían en el grado de veracidad con respecto a la compra de votos usando experimentos de lista incluido en 10 encuestas originales realizadas en ocho países latinoamericanos. El análisis demuestra la prevalencia generalizada del subregistro y también muestra que dos fuentes de sensibilidad de preguntas mejor predicen el subregistro de la compra de votos entre los países. Primero, a causa de mayor conciencia y internalización de normas contra la compra de votos entre los más educados, el sesgo de deseabilidad social es asociado positivamente con educación. Segundo, porque la compra de votos frecuentemente está estigmatizada como el resultado de la pobreza, los que están particularmente sensibles a preguntas sobre ingresos también llegan a ser mucho más propensos a editar sus respuestas.

Palabras clave: Compra de votos, clientelismo, sesgo de deseabilidad social, América Latina, experimentos de lista

Introduction

Vote buying, which is a narrow form of clientelism that entails the exchange of material goods for a person's vote at the individual level (Stokes 2007a, 606), is an important concern for scholars studying the quality of democracy in many developing countries (e.g. Schaffer 2007a, Stokes 2007a; Stokes et al. 2013). Increasingly, scholars have begun going beyond ethnographic-based studies of such exchanges (e.g. Auyero 2000; Schaffer 2007a; Schedler 2004) and turned toward large-n representative surveys to study the incidence and targeting of vote buying (e.g. Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008).¹ While the move toward the use of surveys to study the dynamics of vote buying is certainly worthwhile, scholars have generally shown little attention to the validity of the survey items used to detect vote buying.

However, recent studies have demonstrated that standard items used to assess vote buying can significantly underestimate true levels of its frequency (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012; Corstange 2012). Such items usually ask respondents directly whether they have received some sort of good, gift, or favor from a political party or candidate during electoral campaigns. While seemingly straightforward enough, such obtrusive items can generate significant levels of social desirability bias, which occurs when respondents over (under)report socially (un)desirable behavior or attitudes in order to make themselves look better in the eyes of the interviewer. As a result, vote buying estimates based on direct questions not only are likely to generate significant underestimates of the practice, but also such bias is likely to prove systematic, calling into question parameter estimates from multivariate analyses.

What explains individual level variation in social desirability bias in response to questions on vote buying? Although previous works have shown that social desirability bias is likely to occur with obtrusive vote buying items and that this bias can be systematic, they have not explored the determinants of the variation in bias across subgroups. First, being able to predict which types of people are likely to edit their responses to vote buying questions will increase scholars' capacity to anticipate biases in multivariate analyses using standard direct items. Second, since social desirability bias arises in the context of the complex social interaction entailed in survey interviews, variation in social desirability bias can also provide useful information about the distribution of social norms about vote buying in particular societies (e.g. Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014).

This paper explores patterns in social desirability bias across demographic and political variables commonly included in analyses of vote buying using list experiments implemented in original surveys conducted after 10 elections in 8 Latin American countries. The analysis sustains several main arguments. First, the underreporting of vote buying across the sample varies significantly, from rates as high as 22 percent in

¹ For example, both the AmericasBarometer and AfroBarometer have begun asking about clientelistic exchanges in recent survey rounds.

the case of the 2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections to essentially 0 percent in elections in Uruguay (2009), Chile (2009), and Bolivia (2009 and 2010). Second, the results support the argument that variations in social desirability bias can be attributed to two main factors: (1) awareness of social norms about the acceptability of vote buying, as proxied by levels of respondent education, and (2) sensitivity to interviewer perceptions of socioeconomic status and the popular association between vote buying and poverty.

The analysis does not find consistent support across the cases for a number of alternative hypotheses or demonstrate significant variation in social desirability bias across other demographic variables commonly included in analyses of vote buying. Specifically, social desirability bias is not consistently related to respondents' socioeconomic status, strength of partisanship, identification with traditionally clientelistic or non-clientelistic parties, beliefs about the secrecy of the ballot, reciprocity, gender, or age.

Social Desirability Bias

While few studies have examined the role of social desirability bias with regard to vote buying, studies focusing on a wide range of sensitive attitudes and behaviors suggest that such bias arises as a result of a complex social interaction (for reviews, see DeMaio 1984; Johnson and Van de Vijver 2003; Tourangeau and Yan 2007). Although the definition of social desirability bias is not uncontested (DeMaio 1984), the basic idea is relatively clear. In the face of sensitive questions—that is, those that ask about normatively charged behaviors or attitudes—many people over report socially desirable behavior or attitudes. During the survey response process, respondents will often edit their responses in order to make themselves look better in the eyes of the interviewer and to avoid anticipated social disapproval for admitting to holding contra-normative attitudes or engaging in socially undesirable behaviors.² Specifically, respondents who have engaged in the socially undesirable behavior frequently respond in the socially desirable direction if they find the survey item particularly threatening given the context of the interview (Bradburn, Sudman, Blair, and Stocking 1978).

What makes survey items sensitive in the eyes of respondents? Social desirability bias arises primarily from the characteristics of specific questions and the social interaction encompassed within the survey interview (see Tourangeau and Yan 2007 for a review).³ According to Paulhus (2002, 49), this perspective understands socially

² Social desirability bias has been uncovered for a large range of topics, including drug use (e.g. Tourangeau and Smith 1996; Bachman and O'Malley 1981), racial attitudes (e.g. Kuklinski et al. 1997; Berinsky 1999), religious attitudes and behaviors (e.g. Pressor and Stinson 1998; Kane, Craig and Wald 2004), and voter turnout (e.g. Silver, Anderson, and Abramson 1986; Holbrook and Krosnick 2010).

³ Researchers primarily in psychology have suggested that social desirability bias can also result from a response style reflecting underlying personality traits that affect responses across interviews and time (Paulhus 2002, 49). See, for example, Crowne and Marlowe (1960), Eysenck and Eysenck (1964); Johnson and Van de Vijver (2003, 196-200), Berinsky (2004), Paulhus (1991), and

desirable responding as a response set in which short-term biases arise out of the interview process itself. Respondents answer in socially desirable manners since the interview is a social process that is dictated by conversational norms (Sudman, Bradburn, and Schwarz 1996, 62-64).

The degree to which a respondent connects a particular survey item or battery of survey items to a particular salient social norm increases the likelihood that the respondent will view the item as sensitive. Particular norms influence behavior, including survey responses, insofar as an individual is aware of the norm and has either internalized it or is sensitive to norm enforcement mechanisms, which in the case of surveys is the potential disapproval on the part of the interviewers (Rind and Benjamin 1994). Thus, not only must the respondent be aware of the relevant norm but he also must make the cognitive connection between the wording of a particular item and the social norm. For example, the degree to which a respondent is aware of norms against drug use and is able to cognitively connect a particular item(s) to this norm should be positively related to the respondent's perception of item sensitivity, given norm non-compliance. As proof of this contention, studies have shown a significant correlation between the degree of perceived sensitivity of certain questions and rates of social desirability bias (e.g. Bradburn et. al. 1978; Presser 1984).

Social Desirability Bias and Vote Buying

To understand among which groups questions about vote buying are likely to prove most sensitive and therefore to induce the greatest levels of underreporting, it is necessary to examine (1) the norms associated with such clientelistic exchanges and (2) the likelihood that different groups in society connect such norms to direct questions about vote buying included on mass surveys. Two main types of norms are associated with vote buying, as Stokes (2005) explains in a cogent footnote: "...the main problem with the survey approach used here is that people may be reluctant to acknowledge receiving handouts, in the Argentine case probably as much because of the implication that they are poor enough to sell their votes as out of concern about the illegality or immorality of their actions" (321, fn. 20). Regarding the latter, admitting to being involved in a vote buying exchange means that respondents are also disclosing that they have broken democratic norms against such transactions.⁴ The private exchange of goods or favors for votes violates such norms by lessening citizens' ability to freely exercise their right to vote (Fox 1994), making citizens accountable to politicians rather than vice versa (Stokes 2005), and providing incentives for elected officials to enact policies that keep citizens in poverty traps (Magaloni 2006). Second, vote buying is associated with poverty, and given social norms regarding socioeconomic status,

Snyder and Gangestad, (1986). While a potentially useful avenue for future research, the lack of personality items on the surveys analyzed in this paper preclude testing such hypotheses.

⁴ While Stokes also notes the issue of the illegality of vote buying, the fact that weak state capacities in developing countries generally preclude enforcement of such laws means that democratic norms are generally the most relevant consideration here.

acknowledging a vote buying exchange may demonstrate that the respondent is poor or lacks socioeconomic independence in the eyes of the interviewer.

While it is easy for scholars to understand the connection between democratic norms and vote buying, it is far from clear that all people in new democracies are equally cognizant of such norms much less have internalized them or view themselves as subject to social sanction for non-compliance. Norms against clientelism tend to emerge from elites, with opposition and middle class parties politicizing vote buying by incumbent parties or NGOs conducting campaigns against the practice (Cornelius 2004; Schaffer 2007b). New political norms, such as norms about democracy and clientelism, are adopted based on a political learning process (Mattes and Bratton 2007). In this process, the most educated and politically aware are the most likely to absorb new norms being forwarded by political and social elites as a result of greater opportunities for exposure to such norms (Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1983; DiPalma, and McClosky 1970; Geddes and Zaller 1989; Zaller 1992). In contrast, those with lower levels of education and political awareness are less likely to connect the abstract democratic norms with what is on its face a positive transaction in the lives of many citizens (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014).⁵

H1: Social desirability bias should be positively associated with education.

In a similar sense, those who are the most likely to benefit from vote buying—the poor—are unlikely to understand such exchanges in the same way as those for whom relatively inexpensive gifts make no meaningful difference in their daily lives. In his analysis of the effectiveness of anti-vote buying campaigns in the Philippines, Schaffer (2007c) argues that such campaigns have generally been unsuccessful, since “[c]ivic education campaigns present an upper- and middle-class view of vote buying that does not match up well with how the poor themselves experience it” (164). Instead, many poor clients actually see such exchanges as part of everyday “problem-solving networks” imbued with “trust, solidarity, reciprocity, caring, and hope” rather than a normatively stigmatized practice (Auyero 2000, 73).

**H2: Social desirability bias should be positively associated with income/
socioeconomic status.**

A second way in which norms against vote buying may induce social desirability bias is related to the perceived effects of admitting to vote buying on the perceptions of groups to which they belong. In particular, respondents may be loath to admit to vote buying out of concern for their party’s reputation. That is, strong partisans are likely to edit their answers to direct questions so that the survey’s publicized results do not

⁵ In a related domain, the hypothesis tying political awareness (and/or education) with greater levels of social desirability bias finds support with regard to questions about voter turnout. Since the more politically aware and educated are more likely to be aware of and to have internalized norms about voting, they are the most likely to over report turning out to vote (Fullerton, Dixon, and Borch 2007; Silver, Anderson, and Abramson 1986).

damage the standing of their party. As a result, strong party identifiers should be more likely than weakly affiliated citizens and independents to provide biased answers.

H3: Social desirability bias should be positively associated with strength of partisan attachment.

However, those who identify with parties that have traditionally utilized clientelistic campaign strategies are less likely to stigmatize the practice, perhaps due to partisan socialization efforts to legitimize the practice by party elites among the rank and file and/or through greater experience with such exchanges over time (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014). Thus, partisans of traditionally clientelistic parties should be more likely to see the tactic as an everyday part of politics, while partisans of traditionally non-clientelistic parties should be more likely to stigmatize the practice and view survey items about vote buying as sensitive. This greater stigmatization could result not only from less consistent experience with the positive individual level benefits of the vote buying transactions, but also due to greater exposure to elite efforts to denounce vote buying.

H4: Social desirability bias should be lower for those individuals who identify with parties that have traditionally employed clientelistic practices, while it should be higher for those who identify with non-clientelistic parties.

The second set of vote buying norms revolves around the perceived association between poverty and vote buying. Popular and scholarly accounts of vote buying suggest that it results from poverty and ignorance, both of which are stigmatized behaviors. By admitting to receiving a gift or favor, respondents essentially acknowledge that they are poor and dependent, which social norms generally dictate as undesirable characteristics. For example, in Schedler's (2004) interviews of Mexicans, he notes that respondents strongly associated vote buying with needy people ("*gente necesitada*") and the ignorant, and he argues that respondents did not admit to receiving any gifts from parties at least partly because of this stigma (66-67). Consequently, we should expect that those most sensitive to interviewers' perceptions of their socioeconomic status should be more likely to provide biased responses to vote buying questions, which are strongly associated with images of poverty.

H5: Social desirability bias should be positively associated with respondents' sensitivity toward perceptions of their socioeconomic status.

Cases, Data, and Methods

To test these hypotheses and to explore other possible patterns in social desirability bias across common demographic and political variables often included in analyses of vote buying, this paper analyzes original survey data collected after 10 elections in eight Latin American countries. The elections include the 2008 Nicaraguan municipal elections, 2009 Mexican legislative elections, 2009 Uruguayan general elections, 2009 Chilean general elections, 2009 Bolivian general elections, 2009 Honduran general elections, 2010 Bolivian regional/municipal elections, 2011 Guatemalan general elections, 2011 Argentine general elections, and 2011 Nicaraguan general elections. All surveys were conducted face-to-face and were nationally representative, with the exceptions of the two Bolivian surveys (only urban areas) and the Argentine survey (only Greater Buenos Aires). A detailed description of the methodology for each of the surveys is available in Appendix A of the supplementary materials.

To generate unbiased measures of the receipt of goods or favors during the electoral campaigns, the surveys included list experiments, also known as the item count technique (ICT). Scholars have used list experiments for several decades to study a large range of attitudes and behaviors thought to be subject to social desirability pressures including, e.g., risky behaviors such as drug use (Anderson et al. 2007; Biemer and Brown 2005; Miller 1984), racism (Kuklinski et al. 1997), attitudes about electoral fairness and violence (Weghorst 2010), attitudes toward different presidential candidate characteristics (Heerwig and McCabe 2009; Kane et al. 2004; Streb et al. 2008) and unethical behavior in the workplace (Dalton et al. 1994).⁶

The best manner to explain how the list experiment works is to do so by example. The list experiments included in the studies proceeded as follows. Survey respondents were randomly assigned to either a treatment group or a control group, and members of each group were read the following:

During electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens in different ways to vote for them. I'm going to show you a list of activities and I would like for you to tell me how many of these activities the parties completed during the presidential campaign to obtain your vote. Don't tell me which ones, only HOW MANY (zero activities, one, two, three,...).⁷

⁶ More detailed reviews of the use of list experiments are available in Holbrook and Krosnick (2010), Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson (forthcoming), and Blair and Imai (2012).

⁷ The question wording comes from the survey conducted after the 2009 Honduran general elections. The exact wording of the experiments varied somewhat by survey, reflecting local wording conventions and efforts to improve comprehension. See Appendix B.

Members of the control group were then read and given a show card with the following items:

- **They hung up campaign posters in this neighborhood**
- **They organized a political rally in your community**
- **They put political advertisements on television or radio**
- **A presidential candidate visited your home.**⁸

Members of the treatment list were shown and read the same list of items along with one additional item, placed in the third position:

- **They gave you a gift or did you a favor**

Since respondents are only asked to count the number of items on the list that they completed/applied to them but not which ones, it is impossible for the interviewer to know whether the respondent includes the sensitive item (receipt of gifts or favors) or not.⁹ As a result, the question provides the respondent with a high degree of anonymity and social desirability bias pressures should be greatly reduced.

However, due to random assignment to treatment and control groups, researchers can generate aggregate and subgroup level estimates by comparing the mean number of items indicated by members of the treatment and control groups.¹⁰ Beyond this basic difference of means estimator, scholars have developed multivariate techniques to analyze list experiments, including OLS regressions with fixed interactions between covariates and assignment to treatment (e.g. Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012) as well as more efficient but less robust maximum likelihood estimators (Blair and Imai 2012; Corstange 2009; Imai 2011). While research on the validity of list experiments remains ongoing, list experiment estimates tend to be higher than estimates from direct questions for sensitive items but not for non-sensitive items (e.g. Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; Dalton et al. 1994; LaBrie and Earleywine 2000; Tsuchiya et al. 2007), and list experiment estimates are likely to be conservative due to the counting process required by the technique (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson 2013; Biemer et al. 2005; Tsuchiya et al. 2007).¹¹

⁸ In an effort to increase estimation efficiency (Glynn 2013), the number of control items was reduced to three, starting with the surveys conducted during the 2011 elections.

⁹ The anonymity breaks down if the respondent answers 0 or the maximum number of items on the list. Researchers should choose control items carefully to minimize such ceiling or floor effects. The vote buying list experiments reported here included rare items such as “a presidential candidate visited your home” to avoid the particularly damaging ceiling effects. However, to the extent that such ceiling effects exist, they will lead to underestimates.

¹⁰ For example, if members of the treatment group indicate 2.7 items on average and members of the control group indicate 2.5 items on average, then we would estimate that 20 percent $((2.7-2.5)*100)$ of respondents received gifts or favors.

¹¹ Tests by Holbrook and Krosnick (2010) and Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson (2013) also demonstrate that the difference in list length between treatment and control groups are unlikely to artificially inflate list experiment estimates. Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson (2013) also find little heterogeneity in the likelihood of either artificially inflated or deflated list experiment estimates across common demographic variables.

In order to assess the degree of social desirability bias, all of the surveys also included direct questions about the receipt of good or favors by the respondents. To test whether social desirability bias varies significantly across levels of education (H1), the analysis includes a three-point education variable ranging from primary school or less complete (1) to postsecondary education (3). The socioeconomic status hypothesis (H2) is assessed using measures of income or wealth. Due to different response scales used in each study, the SES measure is standardized (mean=0, sd=1) by study. The impact of partisan strength (H3) is tested with a three point variable ranging from independents (0) to strong partisans (2). As a rough proxy for sensitivity to perceptions of socioeconomic status (H5), the analysis includes a binary variable indicating whether the respondent did not give an answer to the income question (1) or provided an answer (0), with the expectation that those who would not provide an answer to the income question are the most sensitive to perceptions of socioeconomic status.¹²

H4 requires information about the degree to which different parties have traditionally employed clientelistic practices. The coding of different partisans is based on questions on the perceived use of particularistic incentives by parties included in the survey of experts conducted by the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt 2013).¹³ Those respondents who identify with a specific party were assigned the average score given by the experts for the party (variable b1), while respondents indicating “other” or minor parties were assigned the average of all other minor parties included in the sample, or if no minor parties were coded, the simple average across all parties coded. Independents were assigned the average level of effort parties and candidates make to use clientelistic inducements in the political system as a whole (variable b6).¹⁴

The surveys also contained a number of other demographic and political variables generally included in analyses of vote buying. These include gender (female=1), age (three-point scale), turnout propensity (voted in last election=1, abstained=0) (Gans Morse et al. forthcoming), a four-point reciprocity scale (e.g. Finan and Schechter 2012; Lawson and Greene 2011), and a binary item indicating doubts about the secrecy of the ballot (Stokes 2005; Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012). Descriptive statistics and variable operationalizations are available in Appendix B of the supplementary materials.

Empirical Strategy and Analysis

Social desirability bias is the difference in the probability of providing a social desirable response (SDR) and the probability of actually engaging in the socially desirable behavior (SDB). If we make the assumption that the list experiments provide an

¹² The SES variable for the two Bolivian surveys is based on an index of ownership of a variety of consumer goods rather than income, so the missing income variable is not available for these studies.


¹³ The question text for these two items is available in Appendix B of the supplementary materials.

¹⁴ This operationalization was chosen to account for the fact that parties who do not use clientelistic tactics should have a greater positive impact on perceived sensitivity of vote buying on their own partisans than on independents.

unbiased measure of engaging in the socially (un)desirable behavior (SDB) while answers to direct questions provide estimates of the socially (un)desirable response (SDR), then the extent of social desirability bias is simply the difference between the two estimates.

This basic difference of proportions estimate can be extended to multivariate analyses in order to test the hypotheses about the levels of bias across different subgroups outlined above. To make these multivariate comparisons, two models are required: first, answers to the direct vote buying item are regressed on the covariates via logistic regression. Second, answers to the list experiment are regressed on assignment to the treatment list, the covariates of interest, and interactions between assignment to treatment and each of the covariates (Holbrook and Krosnick 2010; Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2012; Blair and Imai 2012).¹⁵ Variation in social desirability bias across subgroups is determined by subtracting the predicted proportion of respondents receiving gifts or favors according to direct question model from the predicted proportion from the list experiment model for each subgroup of interest, holding all other covariates at their mean values. Measures of uncertainty for the predictions and social desirability bias estimates are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the parameter estimates from both models.¹⁶

FIGURE 1: SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS ESTIMATES, BY STUDY



Estimated proportions and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations.

¹⁵ The inefficiency of the fixed linear interaction approach has led a number of authors to develop more efficient maximum likelihood estimators for list experiments (Corstange 2009; Imai 2011; Blair and Imai 2012). Unfortunately, implementation of the list experiment models using Blair and Imai's (2012) maximum likelihood estimator were unsuccessful for a number of the country studies, reflecting the difficulty of estimating the likelihood function of the model. Further, the estimator is currently incapable of taking into account sampling weights necessary for several of the analyses. As a consequence, the tests presented here are quite conservative, although they are unbiased (Imai 2011).

¹⁶ Specifically, inference is based on 10,000 simulations of the parameter estimates drawn from the multivariate normal distribution for each of the models.

Starting first at the aggregate level, Figure 1 plots estimates of vote buying provided by the list experiments and direct questions along with the difference between the two (i.e., social desirability bias) for each election study, ordered by date. The figure makes clear that there is both wide variation in the degree of vote buying across the elections as well as the extent to which respondents in the different studies edited their answers to direct questions. Bias from social desirability pressures is greatest in the cases of Nicaragua 2008 (22%), Honduras 2009 (18%), Mexico 2009 (14%), Guatemala (10%), Nicaragua 2011 (7 percent), and Argentina (6%). In contrast, the list experiment estimates are actually lower than the direct estimates in Uruguay 2009, Chile 2009, and both Bolivia surveys, although these differences are not statistically distinguishable, suggesting a lack of social desirability bias in these cases.¹⁷

The final two sets of estimates on the right side of Figure 1 are weighted averages across the studies based on random effects meta regressions,¹⁸ first among all 10 cases and second only among the cases with positive social desirability bias estimates. According to the former meta regression estimate, the average social desirability bias across all of the studies is approximately 6 percentage points, while among those with positive rates of bias, the random effects estimate is approximately 12 points. Further, the estimates suggest that among the cases with positive social desirability estimates, approximately 80 percent of respondents receiving gifts or favors did not answer the direct question truthfully, ranging from a low of 62 percent in Mexico 2009 to a high of 90 and 87 percent in Nicaragua 2008 and 2011, respectively.


The remainder of the analysis examines differences across various subgroups of interest based on differences in predictions of gift or favor receipt from the regressions using the direct item and the list experiment answers as dependent variables. Figure 2 presents the predicted estimates of social desirability bias for those with at least some postsecondary education and those with primary schooling or less, along with the difference between these two estimates, holding all other variables at their mean values. The figure provides support for the expectation (H1) that the educated, who are more likely to be aware of and understand social norms against vote buying, are more likely to lie about the receipt of gifts or favors. With the exceptions of Chile 2009, Bolivia 2009, and Argentina 2011, social desirability bias is greater for higher educated respondent, and especially so for the two Nicaraguan surveys. It is particularly notable that in only one of the cases does the social desirability bias estimate for the lowest educated respondents depart significantly from zero (Honduras 2009), suggesting that members of this group are unlikely or much less likely to lie about receiving gifts or favors than more educated respondents. Across the full sample of cases, the meta regression average estimate of the difference is nearly 8 percentage points ($p=0.14$, one tailed test), and among the cases with positive

¹⁷ The negative social desirability estimates in these cases probably reflects the fact that list experiments are prone to artificially deflated estimates (Kiewiet de Jonge and Nickerson 2013), which makes inference for attitudes and behaviors of low incidence difficult.

¹⁸ The random effects meta regression estimates were implemented using the user defined package `metareg` in Stata 11. The estimates represent weighted averages across the studies, taking into account the uncertainty in the social desirability bias estimates.

aggregate levels of social desirability bias, the difference in social desirability bias is 17 percentage points ($p=0.05$, one tailed test).


FIGURE 2: DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS ACROSS LEVELS OF EDUCATION



Estimated proportions and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the model coefficients.

While there is some support for the education hypothesis (H1), we see little in the way of consistent patterns with regard to socioeconomic status (H2). Figure 3 plots the social desirability bias estimates for the wealthiest respondents (two standard deviations above the mean) and poorest respondents (one standard deviation below the mean), as well as the difference between these estimates. In none of the cases is there a positive and significant difference between the level of social desirability bias for the wealthy and the poor. Against expectations, greater levels of social desirability bias are apparent for the poor than the wealthy in Honduras 2009 and Nicaragua 2011. However, across the studies, the difference in bias across wealth groups is essentially 0, both among all cases and among cases with positive aggregate level bias. This lack of difference between socioeconomic groups provides further support for the contention that the capacity of citizens to understand norms against the practice (as proxied by levels of education) is more important in determining social desirable responding than being member of a group expected to find relatively inexpensive private inducements particularly attractive or a part of everyday politics (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014).

FIGURE 3: DIFFERENCES IN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS ACROSS LEVELS OF INCOME




Estimated proportions and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the model coefficients.

Figure 4 presents the relevant analysis for H3, which suggests that strong partisans should be most likely to misreport the receipt of gifts or favors in order to protect the reputation of their parties. There is little in the way of consistent support for the hypothesis, as in nearly every study the difference in social desirability bias between strong partisans and independents is not distinguishable from zero. The two meta regression estimates confirm this lack of difference across the sample, which suggests that concern about party reputation is not a clear driver of behavioral misreporting.


Similarly, there is no evidence to support the expectation that the level of exposure to clientelism affects the degree to which individuals misreport engaging in vote buying (H4). As Figure 5 demonstrates, there are no significant differences in the level of social desirability bias across the measure of the degree to which different parties utilize vote buying during electoral campaigns. Thus, in contrast to the findings detailed in Gonzalez Ocantos et al. (2014), those who identify with parties that use clientelism extensively (minimally) are not less (more) likely to misreport the receipt of goods or favors.

FIGURE 4: DIFFERENCE IN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS BY PARTISAN STRENGTH



Estimated proportions and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the model coefficients.

FIGURE 5: DIFFERENCE IN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS BY PARTISAN USE OF VOTE BUYING




Estimated proportions and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the model coefficients.

On the other hand, there is strong support for the expectation that those with the greatest sensitivity to questions about their socioeconomic status, as proxied by refusing to answer questions about income, are more likely to provide biased answers (H5). Figure 6 plots the relevant estimates and demonstrates that in 6 of the 8 cases including this variable, those who did not answer the income question were more likely to underreport vote buying, although large levels of uncertainty in the differences

means that the estimates generally do not reach traditional levels of statistical significance at the study level.¹⁹ However, across the 6 cases with positive levels of bias, the random effects meta regression average difference between those who provided an answer to the income question and those who refused is nearly 11 percentage points ($p=0.05$, one tailed test). To the extent that item non-response to the income question is indicative of sensitivity to perceptions of socioeconomic status, then there is significant support for H5.

FIGURE 6: DIFFERENCE IN SOCIAL DESIRABILITY BIAS BY SENSITIVITY ABOUT SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS



Estimated proportions and 95 percent confidence intervals are based on Monte Carlo simulations of the model coefficients.

The models also included a number of other political and demographic variables commonly included in analyses of vote buying, including beliefs about ballot secrecy, attitudes about reciprocity, turnout potential (voted in the last election), age, and gender. While there are differences in bias across these variables for specific countries, there are no statistically significant consistent patterns in social desirability bias for any of these variables for the studies more broadly, as demonstrated in Figures D1-D5 in Appendix D of the supplementary materials. The only variable for which there is some slight evidence of differential bias is for the turnout potential variable. Among studies with positive aggregate social desirability bias estimates, prior voters were over 7 percentage points more likely to misreport vote buying than prior abstainers, although the difference is only significant at the 85 percent level of confidence (one-sided test). If this pattern is not simply due to chance, it could indicate greater support for H1, to the extent that voters are more likely to be aware of and sensitive to norms against vote buying than non-voters.

¹⁹ In the two cases where the opposite appears true (Honduras 2009 and Guatemala 2011), very few respondents refused the income question, and as a result, the uncertainty around these estimates is particularly large.

Conclusions

This study represents the first systematic exploration of social desirability bias associated with direct questions about vote buying. Using a series of list experiments in 10 post-election surveys conducted in Latin America between 2008-2012, the study demonstrates that underreporting of vote buying in response to direct questions varies significantly across elections and countries, and that such bias is systematically related to two main variables. First, consistent with the finding that more educated citizens are more likely to stigmatize vote buying and have a more nuanced understanding of the norms surrounding the practice (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. 2014), on average the analysis demonstrates that education is positively associated with the extent of bias. Second, on average the analysis shows that those who did not answer income questions were also more likely to misreport receiving a gift or favor than those who provided a valid answer. This finding is consistent with the expectation that those who are most sensitive to interviewer perceptions of respondent socioeconomic status would be most likely to edit their answers due to the popular association between vote buying and poverty and dependency.

The implications of the social desirability bias patterns for the analysis of direct questions about vote buying are mixed. While it is clear that the underestimation of vote buying at the aggregate level is a critical concern, for nearly all of the most important variables used in studies seeking to explain party targeting strategies (e.g., income, strength of partisanship, reciprocity, ballot secrecy beliefs), there are no consistent differences in bias across subgroups. Thus, with respect to these variables, on average we might expect that targeting patterns uncovered in multivariate analyses using direct vote buying questions should not be biased, although the overall predicted rates of vote buying often would be. However, while this implication is encouraging, we can only take it so far. Although across the samples on average we do not see systematic differences in social desirability bias for these variables, within specific countries such systematic bias is often apparent, meaning that researchers should continue to employ unobtrusive measurement techniques such as list experiments to assess whether direct questions can still provide unbiased parameter estimates. Further, given the correlation between education and many political variables of interest (e.g., political participation), any multivariate analyses using direct questions should be greeted with significant skepticism. Consequently, while parameter estimates from multivariate analyses using direct questions might not prove systematically biased, researchers' baseline expectation should be that they would be biased until proven otherwise.

While these findings are methodologically important for the study of party targeting strategies, what is perhaps more interesting from a substantive perspective is what the patterns in social desirability bias say about the distribution of norms about vote buying in society. For example, the analysis provides additional support for the

finding that more educated respondents have a greater awareness and understanding of normative prohibitions about the practice (Gonzalez Ocantos et al. forthcoming), and that elite led efforts to stigmatize the practice have proven most effective for those with the highest levels of education and political awareness (e.g. Mattes and Bratton 2007; Chong, McClosky, and Zaller 1983). However, even though higher educated respondents have better internalized the anti-vote buying rhetoric, in many cases the effect of such norms has not been on actual behavior (i.e., receiving gifts for votes) but rather on admitting to doing so. Indeed, in most of the countries included in the sample, there are no significant differences by educational level in the receipt of goods or favors, and in two countries (Mexico and Nicaragua), more educated respondents are actually more likely to be targeted for goods dispensation. Consequently, educated respondents have learned how to be “questionnaire democrats” (Dalton 1994) with regard to vote buying even if their actual behavior says otherwise.

Similarly, the greater levels of misreporting among those who did not respond to the income question are indirectly suggestive that efforts to associate vote buying with poverty and dependency have also filtered into society. Like the education finding, however, it is far from clear that such messages are effective in actually changing behavior during elections or simply during interviews (e.g., Schaffer 2007c).

While this paper provides the first systematic examination of social desirability bias and vote buying, a variety of questions remain for future research. Additional research should confirm the education and income non-response findings using variables that come closer to measuring the theoretical attitudes of interest such as actual evaluations about vote buying. Further, one of the most important future lines of research involves explaining why social desirability bias varies significantly across countries. That is, why is underreporting so much more prevalent in countries like Nicaragua and Honduras but virtually nonexistent in Bolivia or Chile? Similarly, why are citizens in many African and Asian countries much more willing to admit receiving gifts or favors than citizens in Latin America (e.g. Schaffer 2007c, Afrobarometer 2013)?

Appendix A: Survey Methodology

NICARAGUA 2008:

Survey Firm: Borge y Asociados

Field Dates: November 25th-December 8th 2008.

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of adults (18+), excluding the Atlantic autonomous regions

N: 1,008 adults

Sample Design: The survey utilized a multistage random sample with 84 final sampling points (segments), including 12 respondents per segment. Sampling proceeded as follows: The sampling frame consisted of the electoral registry, with primary sampling units chosen proportionate to the size of voting centers within department – municipalities. Within municipalities, random selection proceeded by electoral centers, census tracks, and census blocks, with final sampling points (segments or blocks) containing 12 respondents. Households and respondents within households were chosen randomly in such a way that ensured gender balance.

Weights: none.

AAPOR Response Rate 1: 77%

Randomization Design: Respondents were randomly assigned to either treatment or control lists according to a randomized list devised before implementation of the survey.

MEXICO 2009:

Survey Firm: SIMO

Field Dates: July 24 -27, 2009.

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of adults (18+) with voting credentials, with a 250 respondent oversample of rural areas.

N: 1,250 adults

Sample Design: The survey utilized a multistage random sample with 125 final sampling points (segments), with a target of 10 respondents per segment. Sampling proceeded as follows: The sampling frame consisted of the voting precincts defined by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE). The sample was first stratified by urban, rural, and mixed areas, and then within each strata, voting precincts were selected proportionate to size. The sampling frame to extract the oversample included only the rural sections which had not been previously selected in the original sample. The sampling method was also proportionate to size. To select households, interviewers started from the address of the voting precinct. If this address was a household the surveyors started their interviews on it, if not they went to their

right, discarded three houses and attempted to get a survey in this house. This system continued, following a spiral shaped pattern always to the right. Usually, each surveyor completed 10 surveys per section.

Weights: Weights correct for rural oversample.

AAPOR Response Rate 1: 33%

Randomization Design: The survey battery included one other question that required randomization such that the combination of the different question versions resulted in 4 different questionnaires. Each questionnaire was applied according to a predetermined randomized list at the final sampling point level.

HONDURAS 2009

Survey Firm: Borge y Asociados

Field Dates: January 16-25 2010

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of adults (18+), excluding the sparsely populated department of Gracias a Dios and the Bay Islands.

N: 1,008 adults

Sample Design: The survey utilized a multistage random sample with 84 final sampling points (segments), including 12 respondents per segment. Sampling proceeded as follows: The sampling frame consisted of the electoral registry, with primary sampling units chosen proportionate to the size of voting centers within department – municipalities. Within municipalities, random selection proceeded by electoral centers, census tracks, and census blocks, with final sampling points (segments or blocks) containing 12 respondents. Households and respondents within households were chosen randomly in such a way that ensured gender balance.

AAPOR Response Rate 1: 50%

Randomization Design: The survey battery included two other questions that required randomization such that the combination of the different questions resulted in 12 different questionnaires. Each of the 12 questionnaires was applied according to a predetermined randomized list within each sampling unit, each of which included 12 respondents.

URUGUAY 2009

Survey Firm: Equipos Mori

Field Dates: December 15-18, 2009

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of adults (18+)

N: 900

Sample Design: The survey utilized a multistage probability sample of households with quotas utilized within households for the final selection of respondents (Sudman 1966). There were 243 final sampling points, with an average of 4 respondents per sampling point. The sample was first stratified into two grand strata—Montevideo

and the Interior. Within Montevideo, the sample was further stratified by municipal zones. Within the interior, stratification occurred by population, with cities with populations exceeding 30,000 inhabitants automatically included and lower population cities selected randomly proportional to population size. Within cities (interior) and zones (Montevideo), final sampling points were randomly chosen proportionate to population, households were chosen randomly based on a systematic sampling procedure, and within households respondents were selected using sex and age quotas. For rural areas, departments were selected randomly according to population, and within selected departments and segments, national highways were selected. Highway distances (km markers) were then randomly selected as starting points for the selection of households, which were chosen based on predetermined random procedures. In total 6 rural sampling points were chosen.

AAPOR Response Rate 1: 32%, Refusal Rate: 33%

Randomization Design: The survey battery included one other question that required randomization such that the combination of the different question versions resulted in 6 different questionnaires. Each questionnaire was applied according to a predetermined randomized list.

BOLIVIA 2009

Survey Firm: IPSOS-APOYO

Field Dates: December 12-22, 2009

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Representative of adults (18-70 years of age) living in the major urban areas of Bolivia, including La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, El Alto, Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, Tarija, Trinidad, and Cobija.

N: 2,143

Mode: Omnibus face-to-face

Sample Design: The survey utilized a probability sample of households with quotas implemented at the respondent level (within household) of selection. The sample was stratified by zone (cities), and blocks were randomly selected within these strata. Households were selected systematically, with respondents within households selected considering age and gender quotas. 117 final sampling points at the block level were selected, with a median number of respondents per sampling point being 10 respondents.

Weights: Data weighted by population and socioeconomic status.

AAPOR Response Rate 1: 31.84%

Randomization Design: The survey battery included one other question that required randomization such that the combination of the different questions resulted in 8 different questionnaires. Each of the eight questionnaires was applied according to a predetermined randomized list.

BOLIVIA 2010

Survey Firm: IPSOS-APOYO

Field Dates: April 2010

Mode: Omnibus Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Representative of adults (18-70 years of age) living in the major urban areas of Bolivia, including La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz, El Alto, Oruro, Potosí, Sucre, Tarija, Trinidad, and Cobija.

N: 2,143

Mode: Omnibus face-to-face

Sample Design: The survey utilized a probability sample of households with quotas implemented at the respondent level (within household) of selection. The sample was stratified by zone (cities), and blocks were randomly selected within these strata. Households were selected systematically, with respondents within households selected considering age and gender quotas.

Weights: Data weighted by population and socioeconomic status.

Randomization Design: The survey battery included one other question that required randomization such that the combination of the different questions resulted in 8 different questionnaires. Each of the eight questionnaires was applied according to a predetermined randomized list.

CHILE 2009

The Chilean battery was included as part of the LAPOP 2010 Americas Barometer Survey. Details on the survey design are available at <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/>.

GUATEMALA 2011

Survey Firm: Borge y Asociados

Field Dates: November 1st-7th 2011.

Mode: Stand alone Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of adults (18+).

N: 504 adults

Sample Design: The sample was drawn from both urban and rural areas and resulted in 504 face-to-face interviews. The multi-stage sampling design was based on the 2002 National Census of Guatemala. Selection of the 84 primary sampling units (PSU) was stratified by the 22 departments. Six interviews were conducted within each PSU with quotas for gender within households. In cases where it was not possible to conduct an interview, the household was replaced by the next household in the same primary sampling unit.

Weights: none.

AAPOR Response Rate 1: 61%. *Refusal rate* 19%.

Randomization Design: Since there was one other LE included in the survey, there were four different questionnaires which were randomly assigned to respondents using a predetermined list.

ARGENTINA 2011

Survey Firm:

Field Dates:

Mode: Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Representative of adults (18+) residing in Greater Buenos Aires.

N: 1500, but list experiment only applied to 755

Sample Design: The survey firm randomly selected 154 sampling points (voting precincts) within the Greater Buenos Aires region. To select households, interviewers started from the address of the voting precinct and randomly selected approximately 10 households to interview.

Weights: Weighted to match 2011 presidential election results.

Randomization Design: Eight different questionnaires were utilized, with four versions including the list experiment analyzed in the paper. Each questionnaire was applied according to a predetermined randomized list.

NICARAGUA 2011

Survey Firm: CABAL

Field Dates: January 28, 2012-February 6, 2012

Mode: Face-to-Face

Sampling Universe: Nationally representative of voting age adults (16+), with a 502 respondent oversample of the departments of Nueva Segovia, Managua, Chontales, Boaco, and Jinotega.

N: 2010

Sample Design: The sample was a multistage random sample, with the sampling universe defined by voting precincts. In the first stage, the country was stratified into six regions. Then, departments were randomly selected within regions proportionate to size. Within departments, final sampling points (voting precincts) were then selected proportionate to size, taking into account oversampling in the departments of Nueva Segovia, Managua, Chontales, Boaco, and Jinotega. To select households, interviewers started from the address of the voting precinct and randomly selected approximately 10 households to interview. There were 196 final sampling points.

Weights: Weights adjust for the oversample, gender, and the 2006 presidential election results.

Randomization Design: The survey battery included one other question that required randomization such that the combination of the different question versions resulted in 4 different questionnaires. Each questionnaire was applied according to a predetermined randomized list.

Appendix B: Variable Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics

TABLE BI: VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION AND QUESTION WORDING

VARIABLE	COUNTRY STUDY	ENGLISH TEXT	SPANISH TEXT
List Experiment	Nicaragua 2008	<p>I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like for you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or activists during the last electoral campaign. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.</p> <p>A. they put up campaign posters or signs in your neighborhood B. they visited your home C. they gave you a gift or did you a favor D. they placed campaign advertisements on television or radio E. they threatened you to vote for them</p> <p>[Mark the number:] 0 1 2 3 4 5</p>	<p>Le voy a entregar una tarjeta donde se le van a mencionar varias actividades, y quisiera que me señale si fueron realizadas por los candidatos y activistas durante la última campaña electoral. Por favor, no me diga cuáles sino solamente CUÁNTAS.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Colocaron carteles/afiches de campaña en su barrio/ciudad • Visitaron su hogar • Le hicieron un regalo o favor • Transmitieron publicidad de campaña por televisión o radio • Lo/la amenazaron para que votara por ellos <p>[Marcar el número de respuestas:] 0 1 2 3 4 5</p>
	México 2009	<p>I am going to hand you a card that mentions various activities, and I would like for you to tell me if they were carried out by candidates or activists during the last electoral campaign to obtain your vote. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY.</p> <p>[Interviewer, SHOW CARD NO. 1] 1) They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighborhood 2) They visited your home 3) They gave you a gift or did you a favor 4) They placed campaign advertisements on television or radio 5) They threatened you to vote for them</p>	<p>Le voy a entregar una tarjeta donde se le van a mencionar varias actividades, y quisiera que me señale si fueron realizadas por los candidatos y activistas durante la última campaña para obtener su voto. Por favor, no me diga cuáles sino solamente CUÁNTAS. (Encuestador, MOSTRAR TARJETA N. 1).</p> <p>1) Colocaron carteles de campaña en su localidad 2) Visitaron su hogar 3) Le hicieron un regalo o favor 4) Transmitieron publicidad de campaña por televisión o radio 5) Lo/la amenazaron para que votara por ellos</p>
	Honduras 2009	<p>During electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens in different ways to vote for them. I'm going to show you a list of activities and I would like for you to tell me how many of these activities the parties completed during the presidential campaign to obtain your vote. Don't tell me which ones, only HOW MANY (zero activities,</p>	<p>Durante las campañas electorales, los candidatos y militantes buscan convencer de diferentes maneras a los ciudadanos para que voten por ellos. Voy a mostrarle una lista de actividades y quisiera que me diga cuantas de estas actividades realizaron los partidos durante la campaña para obtener SU voto. No me diga cuáles, sólo CUANTAS (cero actividades, una, dos, tres...) (MOSTRAR Y LEER TARJETA A).</p>

	<p>one, two, three,...). (SHOW AND READ CARD A).</p> <p>-They hung up campaign posters in this neighborhood -They organized a political rally in your community -They gave you a gift or did you a favor -They put political advertisements on television or radio - A presidential candidate visited your home.</p> <p>0. Zero activities 1. One activity 2. Two activities 3. Three Activities 4. Four activities 5. Five activities</p>	<p>-Colocaron carteles de propaganda en esta zona -Organizaron una concentración política en su comunidad -Le hicieron un regalo o favor -Pasaron avisos de propaganda política en televisión o radio -Un candidato presidencial visitó su hogar</p> <p>0. Cero actividades 1. Una actividad 2. Dos actividades 3. Tres actividades 4. Cuatro actividades 5. Cinco actividades</p>
Uruguay 2009	<p>During electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens in different ways to vote for them. I'm going to show you a list of activities and I would like for you to tell me how many of these activities the parties completed during the second round of the presidential campaign to obtain your vote. Don't tell me which ones, only HOW MANY (zero activities, one, two, three,...). (SHOW AND READ CARD I).</p> <p>-They hung up campaign posters in this neighborhood -They visited your home. -They gave you a gift or did you a favor -They put political advertisements on television or radio - They threatened you to vote for them</p> <p>0. Zero activities 1. One activity 2. Two activities 3. Three Activities 4. Four activities 5. Five activities</p>	<p>Durante las campañas electorales, los candidatos y militantes buscan convencer de diferentes maneras a los ciudadanos para que voten por ellos. Voy a mostrarle una lista de actividades y quisiera que me diga cuántas de estas actividades realizaron los partidos durante la segunda vuelta de la campaña presidencial para obtener SU voto. No me diga cuáles, sólo CUÁNTAS (cero actividades, una, dos, tres,...). (MOSTRAR Y LEER TARJETA I)</p> <p>- Colocaron carteles de propaganda política en esta zona - Visitaron su hogar - Le hicieron un regalo o favor - Pasaron avisos de propaganda política en televisión o radio - Lo amenazaron a Ud. Para que votara por ellos</p> <p>0. Cero actividades 1. Una actividad 2. Dos actividades 3. Tres actividades 4. Cuatro actividades 5. Cinco actividades</p>
Chile 2009	<p>I'm going to give you a card that is going to mention various activities, and I would like for you to let me know how many were completed by candidates and activists during the last campaign to try and obtain your vote. Please, do not tell me which ones, only HOW MANY. [Interviewer, SHOW CARD NO. 1]</p>	<p>Le voy a entregar una tarjeta donde se le van a mencionar varias actividades, y quisiera que me señale cuántas de ellas fueron realizadas por los candidatos y activistas durante la última campaña para obtener su voto. Por favor, no me diga cuáles sino solamente CUÁNTAS. [Encuestador, MOSTRAR TARJETA N. 1]</p> <p>- Colocaron carteles de campaña en su</p>

		<p>-They hung up campaign posters in this neighborhood -They visited your home. -They gave you a gift or did you a favor -They put political advertisements on television or radio - They threatened you to vote for them</p> <p>Number _____</p>	<p>sector - Visitaron su hogar - Le hicieron un regalo o favor - Transmitieron publicidad de campaña por televisión o radio - Lo/la amenazaron para que votara por ellos</p> <p>Número _____</p>
	<p>Bolivia 2009</p>	<p>During electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens in different ways to vote for them. I'm going to show you a list of activities and I would like for you to tell me how many of these activities the parties completed during the presidential campaign to obtain your vote. Don't tell me which ones, only HOW MANY (zero activities, one, two, three,...). (SHOW AND READ CARD A).</p> <p>-They hung up campaign posters in this neighborhood -They visited your home -They gave you a gift or did you a favor -They invited you to participate in a march - They threatened you to vote for them</p> <p>0. Zero activities 1. One activity 2. Two activities 3. Three Activities 4. Four activities 5. Five activities</p>	<p>Durante las campañas electorales, los candidatos y militantes buscan convencer de diferentes maneras a los ciudadanos para que voten por ellos. Voy a mostrarle una lista de actividades que realizaron los partidos durante la última campaña y quisiera que me diga cuántas de estas actividades realizaron para obtener SU voto. No me diga cuáles, sólo CUÁNTAS (una actividad, dos, tres,...). (MOSTRAR Y LEER TARJETA 1)</p> <p>- Colocaron carteles de propaganda política en esta zona - Visitaron su hogar - Le hicieron un regalo o favor - Le invitaron a participar de una marcha. - Lo amenazaron a Ud. para que votara por ellos</p> <p>0. Ninguna actividad 1. Una actividad 2. Dos actividades 3. Tres actividades 4. Cuatro actividades 5. Cinco actividades</p>
	<p>Bolivia 2010</p>	<p>During electoral campaigns, candidates and party workers try to convince citizens in different ways to vote for them. I'm going to show you a list of activities and I would like for you to tell me how many of these activities the parties completed during municipal election campaign to obtain your vote. Don't tell me which ones, only HOW MANY (zero activities, one, two, three,...). (SHOW AND READ CARD A).</p> <p>-They hung up campaign posters in this neighborhood -They visited your home</p>	<p>Durante las campañas electorales, los candidatos y militantes buscan convencer de diferentes maneras a los ciudadanos para que voten por ellos. Voy a mostrarle una lista de actividades que realizaron los partidos durante la última campaña para las elecciones municipales y quisiera que me diga cuántas de estas actividades realizaron para obtener SU voto. No me diga cuáles, sólo CUÁNTAS (una actividad, dos, tres,...). (MOSTRAR Y LEER TARJETA 1)</p> <p>- Colocaron carteles de propaganda política en esta zona - Visitaron su hogar - Le hicieron un regalo o favor - Le invitaron a participar de una marcha.</p>

	<p>-They gave you a gift or did you a favor -They invited you to participate in a march - They threatened you to vote for them</p> <p>0. Zero activities 1. One activity 2. Two activities 3. Three Activities 4. Four activities 5. Five activities</p>	<p>- Lo amenazaron a Ud. para que votara por ellos</p> <p>0. Ninguna actividad 1. Una actividad 2. Dos actividades 3. Tres actividades 4. Cuatro actividades 5. Cinco actividades</p>
Guatemala 2011	<p>For the next two questions, I'm going to turn around and read lists of activities that candidates, party workers, and other people did to convince citizens to vote in a certain way during the elections for President and Congress in September. You will be able to read those lists in cards that I will give to you.</p> <p>For each list, I would like you to count HOW MANY of the items applied to you during the campaign for the September elections. Then, please tell me HOW MANY, not WHICH ONES apply to you.</p> <p>[GIVE R CARD <u>W</u> AND TURN AROUND SO YOU ARE NOT FACING THE RESPONDENT, THEN READ LIST]</p> <p>- You saw campaign flyers in your neighborhood - A presidential candidate visited your home - Someone gave you a gift or did you a favor to get your vote - Someone invited you to a rally in your community</p> <p>(How many items on the list apply to you?)</p> <p>(0) Zero items (1) One item (2) Two items (3) Three items (4) Four items</p>	<p>Para las próximas dos preguntas, me voy a voltear, y le leeré listas de actividades que candidatos, militantes de partidos y otras personas realizaron para convencer a los ciudadanos de votar de determinada manera durante la primera vuelta electoral en Septiembre pasado. Ud. podrá leer esas listas en unas tarjetas que le daré.</p> <p>Le pido que cuente CUANTAS de las siguientes actividades presencié Usted durante la campaña de las elecciones de Septiembre. Por favor, díganos CUANTAS, no CUALES.</p> <p>[ENTREGAR TARJETA <u>W</u> Y VOLTEARSE DE MODO QUE NO MIRE DIRECTAMENTE AL ENTREVISTADO, LUEGO LEA LA LISTA]</p> <p>- Vio usted propaganda electoral en su vecindario. - Un candidato presidencial visitó su hogar. - Alguien le dio un regalo o le hizo un favor para obtener su voto. - Alguien lo invitó a una concentración política en su comunidad.</p> <p>(¿Cuántas actividades de esta lista presencié Usted?)</p> <p>(0) Cero actividades (1) Una actividad (2) Dos actividades (3) Tres actividades (4) Cuatro actividades</p>
Argentina 2011	<p>During electoral campaigns, candidates, party workers, and other persons try to convince citizens to vote for them in different ways. For</p>	<p>Durante las campañas electorales, los candidatos, militantes y otras personas buscan convencer de diferentes maneras a los ciudadanos para que voten por ellos. Para</p>

		<p>the next two questions, I'll show and read to you a list of activities that candidates, party workers, and other people completed during the last electoral campaign in October.</p> <p>[PROVIDE CARD VB4]</p> <p>I would like for you to tell me HOW MANY of the following activities correspond to your experience during the last election campaign. Please, tell me HOW MANY, not WHICH ONES. [READ LIST]</p> <p>a. You saw campaign flyers in your neighborhood b. A presidential candidate visited your home c. Someone gave you a gift or did you a favor to get your vote d. Someone invited you to a rally in your community</p> <p>0) Zero items (1) One item (2) Two items (3) Three items (4) Four items</p>	<p>las próximas dos preguntas le mostraré y leeré listas de actividades que candidatos, militantes de partidos y otras personas realizaron durante la última campaña electoral de Octubre.</p> <p>[ENTREGAR TARJETA VB4]</p> <p>Le pido que me diga CUANTAS de las siguientes actividades corresponden a su experiencia durante la última campaña electoral. Por favor, dígame CUANTAS, no CUALES. [LEER LISTA]</p> <p>a. Vio propaganda electoral en su barrio. b. Un candidato presidencial visitó su hogar. c. Alguien le dio un regalo o le hizo un favor para obtener su voto. d. Alguien lo/a invitó a un acto político en su comunidad.</p> <p>¿Cuántas actividades de esta lista corresponden a su experiencia?</p> <p>(0) Cero actividades (1) Una actividad (2) Dos actividades (3) Tres actividades (4) Cuatro actividades</p>
	<p>Nicaragua 2011</p>	<p>I'm going to show you this card with a list of activities that candidates, political workers, and other persons complete in order to convince citizens to vote in a certain way in past elections.</p> <p>I ask that you count HOW MANY of the following activities did you witness during the last campaign in November. Please, tell me HOW MANY, not WHICH ONES.</p> <p>- You saw campaign flyers in your neighborhood - A presidential candidate visited your home - Someone gave you a gift or did you a favor to get your vote - Someone invited you to a rally in your community</p> <p>(0) Zero items (1) One item (2) Two items (3) Three items (4) Four items</p>	<p>Le voy a mostrar esta tarjeta con una lista de actividades que los candidatos, militantes de partidos y otras personas realizaron para convencer a los ciudadanos de votar de determinada manera en las elecciones pasadas.</p> <p>Le pido que cuente CUANTAS de las siguientes actividades presencié Usted durante la campaña de las elecciones de Noviembre. Por favor, díganos CUANTAS, no CUALES.</p> <p>- Usted vio propaganda electoral en su vecindario - Un candidato presidencial visitó su hogar. - Alguien le dio un regalo o le hizo un favor para obtener su voto. - Alguien lo invitó a una concentración política en su comunidad.</p> <p>(0) Cero actividades (1) Una actividad (2) Dos actividades (3) Tres actividades (4) Cuatro actividades</p>
<p>Treatment list assignment</p>	<p>Nicaragua 2008 México 2009</p>	<p>0= Control list 1= Treatment list</p>	

	Honduras 2009		
	Uruguay 2009		
	Chile 2009		
	Bolivia 2009		
	Bolivia 2010		
	Guatemala 2011		
	Argentina 2011		
	Nicaragua 2011		
Direct Vote Buying	All	0= Did not receive gift or favor 1= Received gift or favor	
	Nicaragua 2008	During the electoral campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from a political party or candidate? Yes=1 No=2	Durante la campaña electoral, ¿recibió Ud. algún regalo o favor de parte de algún partido o candidato? Si=1 No=2
	México 2009	During the electoral campaign, did you receive a gift or favor from a political party or candidate in exchange for your vote? Yes=1 No=2	Durante la campaña electoral, ¿recibió Ud. algún regalo o favor de parte de algún partido o candidato a cambio de su voto? 1) Si 2) No
	Honduras 2009	Did you receive a gift or favor from a party or candidate in exchange for your vote? 0. No 1. Yes	¿Ud. recibió algún regalo o favor de parte de algún partido o candidato a cambio de su voto? 0. No 1. Si
	Uruguay 2009		
	Chile 2009		
	Bolivia 2009		
	Bolivia 2010		
Guatemala 2011	Did you receive a gift or favor from a party or candidate in exchange for your vote during the campaign for the elections in September? (1) Yes (2) No	¿Ud. recibió algún regalo o favor de parte de algún partido o candidato a cambio de su voto durante la campaña electoral de las elecciones de septiembre? (1) Sí (2) No	
Argentina 2011	Did you receive a gift or favor from a party or candidate in exchange for your vote during the campaign for the elections in October? (1) Yes (2) No	¿Ud. recibió algún regalo o favor de parte de algún partido o candidato a cambio de su voto durante la campaña electoral de las elecciones de octubre? (1) Sí (2) No	
Nicaragua 2011	Changing the subject, did you receive a gift or favor from a party or candidate in exchange for your vote during the last electoral campaign? (1) Yes (2) No	Cambiando de tema, ¿Usted recibió algún regalo o favor de parte de algún partido o candidato a cambio de su voto durante la campaña electoral pasada? (1) Sí (2) No	

Education	All	1=Primary education or less 2=Secondary education 3=Postsecondary education	
	Nicaragua 2008	What was your last full year of education? No education: 00 Primary School : 1 2 3 4 5 6 High School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 University: 1 2 3 4 5 6	¿Cuál es el último año de estudios que usted aprobó? 1=Sin escolaridad: 00 1=Primaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 2=Secundaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 3=Universidad: 1 2 3 4 5 6
	México 2009	Until what year did you study? None Primary Incomplete Primary complete Secondary incomplete Secondary complete Preparatory incomplete Preparatory complete Technical education incomplete Technical education complete University incomplete University complete	¿Hasta qué año estudió usted? Nada 01 Primaria incompleta 02 Primaria completa 03 Secundaria incompleta 04 Secundaria completa 05 Preparatoria incompleta 06 Preparatoria completa 07 Carrera técnica incompleta 08 Carrera técnica completa 09 Licenciatura incompleta 10 Licenciatura completa 11
	Honduras 2009	What was your last full year of education? No education: 00 Primary School 1 2 3 4 5 6 High School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 University: 1 2 3 4 5 6	¿Cuál es el último año de estudios que usted aprobó? Sin escolaridad: 00 Primaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Secundaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Universidad: 1 2 3 4 5 6
	Uruguay 2009	STUDIES COMPLETED BY RESPONDENT 1. None 2. Primary Incomplete 3. Primary complete 4. Secondary (UTU) incomplete 5. Secondary (UTU) complete 6. Tertiary incomplete 7. Tertiary complete 8. University incomplete 9. University complete 10. Postgraduate	ESTUDIOS CURSADOS POR EL ENTREVISTADO 1. Ninguno 2. Primaria incompleta 3. Primaria completa 4. Secund., UTU incompl. 5. Secund., UTU compl. 6. Terciaria (no univ.) incom. 7. Terciaria (no univ.) comp 8. Universitario incompleto 9. Universitario completo 10. Posgrado (después de univ.)
	Chile 2009	What was the last year of education that you completed? ____ Year of _____ (primary, secondary, university, superior non-university) (Use the table below for the code) None 0 Primary 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Secondary 9 10 11 12 University 13 14 15 16 17	¿Cuál fue el último año de educación que usted completó o aprobó? ____ Año de _____ (básica, media, universitaria, superior no universitaria) = _____ años total [Usar tabla a continuación para el código] Ninguno 0 Básica 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Media 9 10 11 12

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		Superior (not university) 13 14 15	Universitaria 13 14 15 16 17 Superior (no universitario) 13 14 15
Bolivia 2009	What is the maximum grade of instruction that you have reached?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0. None – illiterate 1. Primary incomplete 2. Primary complete 3. Secondary incomplete 4. Secondary complete 5. Superior technical incomplete 6. Superior technical complete 7. Superior University incomplete 8. Superior University complete 9. Post-graduate 	¿Cuál es el máximo grado de instrucción alcanzado por ud.? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 0. ninguno / analfabeto 1. primaria incompleta 2. primaria completa 3. secundaria incompleta 4. secundaria completa 5. superior técnica incompleta 6. superior técnica completa 7. superior universitaria incompleta 8. superior universitaria completa 9. post grado
Bolivia 2010			
Guatemala 2011	What was your last full year of education?	No education: 00 Primary School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 High School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 University: 1 2 3 4 5 6	¿Cuál es el último año de estudios que usted aprobó? Sin escolaridad: 00 Primaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Secundaria: 1 2 3 4 5 6 Universidad: 1 2 3 4 5 6
Argentina 2011	Could you tell me what is the maximum level of education completed by the head of household?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Less than primary complete 2 Primary complete 3 Secondary incomplete 4 Secondary complete 5 Tertiary incomplete 6 Tertiary complete 7 University incomplete 8 University complete 9 Post-graduate 	¿Podría decirme el máximo nivel educativo alcanzado por el Principal Sostenedor del hogar? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1 Hasta primario incompleto 2 Primario completo 3 Secundario incompleto 4 Secundario completo 5 Terciario incompleto 6 Terciario completo 7 Universitario incompleto 8 Universitario completo 9 Posgrado
Nicaragua 2011	What was your last full year of education?	No education: 00 Primary School: 1 2 3 4 5 6 High School: 1 2 3 4 5 Technical School: 1 2 3 University: 1 2 3 4 5 Superior studies: 1 2 3 4	¿Cuál es el último año que usted aprobó? (0) Sin escolaridad (1) Primaria 1 2 3 4 5 6 (2) Secundaria 1 2 3 4 5 (3) Técnico 1 2 3 (4) Universidad 1 2 3 4 5 (5) Superiores 1 2 3 4
Income/ SES (standardized)	All	Each measure of income/SES was standardized with mean 0 and standard deviation 1, then respondents who did not answer the question were assigned to 0.	
	Nicaragua 2008	Considering your salary and other	Sumando sus salarios y otros ingresos,

	<p>sources of income, how much does your family earn per month?</p> <p>_____</p> <p>[If the respondent does not answer] How much does your family earn per month?</p> <p>Up to C\$ 1,500= 1 Between C\$ 1,501 and C\$ 3,000= 2 Between C\$ 3,001 and C\$ 4,250=3 Between C\$ 4,251 and C\$ 8,500= 4 Between C\$ 8,501 and C\$ 12,750= 5 Between C\$ 12,751 and C\$ 17,000= 6 Between C\$ 17,001 or more=7</p>	<p>¿Cuánto recibe su familia aproximadamente por mes?</p> <p>_____</p> <p>Si no responde, ¿Cuánto recibe su familia aproximadamente por mes?</p> <p>Hasta C\$ 1,500= 1 De C\$ 1,501 a C\$ 3,000= 2 De C\$ 3,001 a C\$ 4,250=3 De C\$ 4,251 a C\$ 8,500= 4 De C\$ 8,501 a C\$ 12,750= 5 De C\$ 12,751 a C\$ 17,000= 6 De C\$ 17,001 a más=7</p>
México 2009	<p>Considering everything that this family makes, how much per month do all of the family members who works make?</p> <p>1) Up to \$1,500 2) \$1,501-\$3,000 3) \$3,001-\$6,000 4) \$6,001-\$12,000 5) More than \$12,000</p>	<p>¿Sumando todo lo que ganan en su familia, como cuánto ganan todos los que trabajan en su familia al mes?</p> <p>1) Hasta \$1,500 2) \$1,501-\$3,000 3) \$3,001-\$6,000 4) \$6,001-\$12,000 5) Más de \$12,000</p>
Honduras 2009	<p>Considering your salary and other sources of income, how much does your family earn per month?</p> <p>_____</p> <p>[If the respondent does not answer] How much does your family earn per month?</p> <p>1. Less than L 3800 per month 2. From L 3800 to L 7600 3. From L 7600 to L 11400 4. From L 11400 to L 15200 5. From L 15200 to L 19000 6. More than L 19000</p>	<p>Sumando sus salarios y otros ingresos, ¿Cuánto recibe su familia aproximadamente por mes?</p> <p>_____</p> <p>Si no responde, ¿Cuánto recibe su familia aproximadamente por mes?</p> <p>1. Menos de L 3800 por mes 2. De L 3800 a L 7600 3. De L 7600 a L 11400 4. De L 11400 a L 15200 5. De L 15200 a L 19000 6. Más de L 19000</p>
Uruguay 2009	<p>And to finish, could you indicate on this card (SHOW CARD), the TOTAL income, PER MONTH, APPROXIMATELY, of this household?</p> <p>1. Up to \$2.099 2. \$2.100 to \$4.099 3. \$4.100 to \$7.099 4. \$7.100 to \$11.099 5. \$11.100 to \$16.099 6. \$16.100 to \$22.099</p>	<p>Y para terminar, ¿podría Ud. indicarme, en esta tarjeta (MOSTRAR TARJETA), el ingreso TOTAL, POR MES, APROXIMADO, de este hogar?</p> <p>1. Hasta \$2.099 2. \$2.100 a \$4.099 3. \$4.100 a \$7.099 4. \$7.100 a \$11.099 5. \$11.100 a \$16.099 6. \$16.100 a \$22.099 7. \$22.100 a \$29.099 8. \$29.100 a \$44.099 9. \$44.100 a \$59.099</p>

	<p>7. \$22.100 to \$29.099</p> <p>8. \$29.100 to \$44.099</p> <p>9. \$44.100 to \$59.099</p> <p>10. \$59.100 to \$78.099</p> <p>11. \$78.100 to \$97.099</p> <p>12. \$97.100 to \$130.099</p> <p>13. \$130.100 to \$159.099</p> <p>14. \$159.100 or more</p>	<p>10. \$59.100 a \$78.099</p> <p>11. \$78.100 a \$97.099</p> <p>12. \$97.100 a \$130.099</p> <p>13. \$130.100 a \$159.099</p> <p>14. \$159.100 o más</p>
Chile 2009	<p>In which of the following ranges is your family's monthly income, including remittances from abroad and income from all of the adults and children who work? [If he/she does not understand, ask, How much money in total enters your house per month?]</p> <p>(00) No income (01) Less than 85.000 pesos (02) Between 86,000 and 158,000 pesos (03) Between 159,000 and 203,000 pesos (04) Between 204,000 and 278,000 pesos (05) Between 279,000 and 314,000 pesos (06) Between 315,000 and 433,000 pesos (07) Between 434,000 and 453,000 pesos (08) Between 454,000 and 530,000 pesos (09) Between 531,000 and 812,000 pesos (10) More than 813,000 pesos</p>	<p>¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentran los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar, incluyendo las remesas del exterior y el ingreso de todos los adultos e hijos que trabajan? [Si no entiende, pregunte: ¿Cuánto dinero entra en total a su casa al mes?]</p> <p>(00) Ningún ingreso (01) Menos de 85.000 pesos (02) Entre 86.000 y 158.000 pesos (03) Entre 159.000 y 203.000 pesos (04) Entre 204.000 y 278.000 pesos (05) Entre 279.000 y 314.000 pesos (06) Entre 315.000 y 433.000 pesos (07) Entre 434.000 y 453.000 pesos (08) Entre 454.000 y 530.000 pesos (09) Entre 531.000 y 812.000 pesos (10) Más de 813.000 pesos</p>
Bolivia 2009	Five point socioeconomic scale based on questions on ownership of household goods, housing characteristics, and employment status-profession.	
Bolivia 2010		
Guatemala 2011	<p>Adding together your salaries and other income, how much does your family receive approximately per month? _____</p> <p>IF R DOES NOT ANSWER THEN ASK WITH THE SCALE:</p> <p>1) less than q 1540 per month 2) from q1540 to q 3069 3) from q 3070 to q 4589 4) from q 4590 to q 6099 5) from q 6100 to q 7100 6) more than q 7100</p>	<p>Sumando sus salarios y otros ingresos, ¿Cuánto recibe su familia aproximadamente por mes? _____</p> <p>—</p> <p>SI NO CONTESTA ENTONCES PRUEBE CON LA ESCALA</p> <p>1) menos de q 1540 por mes 2) de q1540 a q 3069 3) de q 3070 a q 4589 4) de q 4590 a q 6099 5) de q 6100 a q 7100</p>

			6) mas de q 7100
	Argentina 2011	To finish up, could you tell me in which of the following ranges is your family's monthly income? 1 No income 2 Less than \$1.200 3 Between \$ 1.201 to \$ 2.000 4 Between \$2.001 to \$2.600 5 Between \$2.601 to \$3.300 6 Between \$3.301 to \$4.200 7 Between \$4.201 to \$5.200 8 Between \$5.201 to \$6.800 9 Between \$6.801 to \$8.900 10 Between \$8.901 to \$13.000 11 More than \$13.000	Para finalizar, podría decirme ¿En cuál de los siguientes rangos se encuentra los ingresos familiares mensuales de este hogar? 1 Ningún ingreso 2 Menos de \$1.200 3 Entre \$ 1.201 y \$ 2.000 4 Entre \$2.001 y \$2.600 5 Entre \$2.601 y \$3.300 6 Entre \$3.301 y \$4.200 7 Entre \$4.201 y \$5.200 8 Entre \$5.201 y \$6.800 9 Entre \$6.801 y \$8.900 10 Entre \$8.901 y \$13.000 11 Más de \$13.000
	Nicaragua 2011	Adding up your salary and other income, how much does your family receive approximately per month? If R does not respond, probe with scale: (1) Up to C\$ 1,500 (2) C\$ 1,501-3000 (3) C\$ 3,001-4,250 (4) C\$4,251-8,500 (5) C\$ 8,501- 12,750 (6) C\$ 12,751 – 17,000 (7) C\$ 17,001 or more	Sumando su salario y otros ingresos, ¿cuánto recibe su familia aproximadamente por mes? Si no responde, pruebe con escala (1) Hasta C\$ 1,500 (2) C\$ 1,501-3000 (3) C\$ 3,001-4,250 (4) C\$4,251-8,500 (5) C\$ 8,501- 12,750 (6) C\$ 12,751 – 17,000 (7) C\$ 17,001 o más
Income No Answer	Nicaragua 2008 México 2009 Honduras 2009 Uruguay 2009 Chile 2009 Bolivia 2009 Bolivia 2010 Guatemala 2011 Argentina 2011 Nicaragua 2011	0 = Answered Income Question 1= Did not answer (refuse or don't know) income question	
Partisan Strength	All	0 = Does not sympathize with a party / independent 1= Very weakly/ somewhat weakly / not strongly or weakly sympathize with a party 2= Strongly/ very strongly sympathize with a party	
	Nicaragua 2008	With which party do you currently sympathize? Sandinista National Liberation Front=1 Liberal Constitutional Party=2 Nicarguan Liberal Alliance=3 Sandinista Renovation Movement=4	¿Con cuál Partido Político simpatiza usted actualmente? Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional=1 Partido Liberal Constitucionalista=2 Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense=3 Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista=4 Otro _____

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	<p>Other _____</p> <p>0 = Does not sympathize with any party 1.5 = Sympathizes with a party [No follow up question on strength of partisanship]</p>	
México 2009	<p>Generally, with which political party do you identify?</p> <p>1) Strongly PAN 2) Somewhat PAN 3) Strongly PRI 4) Somewhat PRI 5) Strongly PRD 6) Somewhat PRD 7) Other (specify) _____ 8) None</p>	<p>Generalmente ¿con qué Partido Político se identifica?</p> <p>1) Muy panista 2) Algo panista 3) Muy priista 4) Algo priista 4) Muy perredista 5) Algo perredista 6) Otros (esp) _____ 7) Ninguno</p>
Honduras 2009	<p>With which political party do you currently sympathize? DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES</p> <p>0. None 1. LIBERAL 2. NATIONAL 3. UD 4. DC 5. PINU 6. Other: _____</p> <p>(IF SYMPATHIZES) And would you say that your sympathy for (this party) is weak or strong?</p> <p>1. Very weak 2. Weak 3. Neither weak nor strong 4. Strong 5. Very strong</p>	<p>¿Con cuál Partido Político simpatiza usted actualmente?</p> <p>0. Ningún 1. LIBERAL 2. NACIONAL 3. UD 4. DC 5. PINU 6. Otro: _____</p> <p>(SI SIMPATIZA) ¿Y Ud. diría que su simpatía por (ese partido) es débil o fuerte?</p> <p>1. Muy débil 2. Débil 3. Ni débil Ni fuerte 4. Fuerte 5. Muy Fuerte</p>
Uruguay 2009	<p>People think differently with respect to political parties. Regardless of the party concerned, do you consider yourself a strong sympathizer, a weak sympathizer, or do you not have defined sympathies with any party?</p> <p>1. Strong sympathizer 2. Weak sympathizer 3. Do not have any defined sympathies _____</p>	<p>La gente piensa diferente respecto a los partidos políticos. Sin importar del partido que se trate, ¿Ud. se considera simpatizante fuerte de algún partido, simpatizante a secas o no tiene simpatías definidas por ningún partido?</p> <p>1. Simpatizante fuerte 2. Simpatizante a secas 3. No tiene simpatías definidas _____</p>
Chile 2009	<p>At this moment, do you sympathize with a political party?</p> <p>1) Yes 2) No</p> <p>0 = Does not sympathize with any party 1.5 = Sympathizes with a party [No follow up question on strength of partisanship]</p>	<p>¿En este momento, simpatiza con algún partido político?</p> <p>(1) Si (2) No</p> <p>0 = Does not sympathize with any party 1.5 = Sympathizes with a party [No follow up question on strength of partisanship]</p>

	follow up question on strength of partisanship]	question on strength of partisanship]
Bolivia 2009	<p>With which party do you sympathize?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. MAS 2. PPB-CN 3. National Unity 4. Social Alliance 5. MNR 6. Other 7. None <p>(IF SYMPATHIZES) And would you say that your sympathy for (this party) is weak or strong?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very weak 2. Weak 3. Neither weak nor strong 4. Strong 5. Very strong 	<p>¿Con cuál partido simpatiza?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. MAS 2. PPB-CN 3. Unidad Nacional 4. Alianza Social 5. MNR 6. Otro 7. Ninguno <p>(SI SIMPATIZA) ¿Y Ud. diría que su simpatía por (ese partido) es débil o fuerte? (PREGUNTAR MATIZ)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Muy débil 2. Débil 3. Ni/Ni 4. Fuerte 5. Muy fuerte
Bolivia 2010	<p>With which party do you sympathize?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. MAS 2. Movimiento Sin Miedo 3. Unidad Nacional 4. MNR 5. Alianza Social 6. PPB-CN 7. SPT 8. Otro (Notar): 9. Ninguno <p>(IF SYMPATHIZES) And would you say that your sympathy for (this party) is weak or strong?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Very weak 2. Weak 3. Neither weak nor strong 4. Strong 5. Very strong 	<p>¿Con cuál partido simpatiza?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. MAS 2. Movimiento Sin Miedo 3. Unidad Nacional 4. MNR 5. Alianza Social 6. PPB-CN 7. SPT 8. Otro (Notar): 9. Ninguno <p>(SI SIMPATIZA) ¿Y Ud. diría que su simpatía por (ese partido) es débil o fuerte?</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Muy débil 2. Débil 3. Ni/Ni 4. Fuerte 5. Muy fuerte
Guatemala 2011	<p>With which Political Party do you currently sympathize? (DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (0) None [GO TO 6] (1) Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (2) Partido Patriota (PP) (3) Gran Alianza Nacional (GANAN) (4) Libertad Democrática Renovada (LIDER) (5) Unión del Cambio Nacional (UCN) (6) Compromiso, Renovación y Orden (CREO) (7) Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (8) Frente Amplio 	<p>¿Con cuál Partido Político simpatiza usted actualmente? (NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS)</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (0) Ninguno [PASE A 6] (1) Unidad Nacional de la Esperanza (UNE) (2) Partido Patriota (PP) (3) Gran Alianza Nacional (GANAN) (4) Libertad Democrática Renovada (LIDER) (5) Unión del Cambio Nacional (UCN) (6) Compromiso, Renovación y Orden (CREO) (7) Encuentro por Guatemala (EG) (8) Frente Amplio (9) Otro: _____ <p>(SI SIMPATIZA) ¿Y Ud. diría que su simpatía por (ese partido) es...? (LEER</p>

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	<p>(9) Other: _____</p> <p>(IF SYMPATHIZES) And would you say that your sympathy for (this party) is...? (READ ALTERNATIVES)</p> <p>(1) Very Weak (2) Weak (3) Neither weak nor strong (4) Strong (5) Very Strong</p>	<p>ALTERNATIVAS)</p> <p>1. Muy débil 2. Débil 3. Ni débil /Ni fuerte 4. Fuerte 5. Muy fuerte</p>
Argentina 2011	<p>With which Political Party do you currently sympathize? (DO NOT READ LIST)</p> <p>[IF R RESPONDS PARTIDO JUSTICIALISTA, ASK IF HE/SHE SYMPATHIZES WITH PERONISMO FEDERAL O WITH THE FRENTE PARA LA VICTORIA. IF THE R INSISTS THAT HE/SHE SYMPATHIZES WITH THE PARTIDO JUSTICIALISTA, MARK THAT OPTION.]</p> <p>(0) None [Go to 3] (1) Frente para la Victoria (2) Peronismo Federal (3) Partido Justicialista (4) Unión Cívica Radical (5) Partido Socialista (6) PRO (7) Proyecto Sur (8) Coalición Cívica</p> <p>(77) Other (specify): _____</p> <p>(IF SYMPATHIZES) And would you say that your sympathy for (this party) is...? (READ ALTERNATIVES)</p> <p>(1) Very Weak (2) Weak (3) Neither weak nor strong (4) Strong (5) Very Strong</p>	<p>¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted? [NO LEER LISTA]</p> <p>[SI RESPONDE PARTIDO JUSTICIALISTA, PREGUNTAR SI SIMPATIZA CON EL PERONISMO FEDERAL O CON EL FRENTE PARA LA VICTORIA. SI EL ENCUESTADO INSISTE EN QUE SIMPATIZA CON EL PARTIDO JUSTICIALISTA, MARCAR ESA OPCION]</p> <p>(0) Ninguno [PASE A 3] (1) Frente para la Victoria (2) Peronismo Federal (3) Partido Justicialista (4) Unión Cívica Radical (5) Partido Socialista (6) PRO (7) Proyecto Sur (8) Coalición Cívica</p> <p>(77) Otro (esp.): _____</p> <p>(SI SIMPATIZA) ¿Y Ud. diría que su simpatía por (ese partido) es...? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>1. Muy débil 2. Débil 3. Ni débil /Ni fuerte 4. Fuerte 5. Muy fuerte</p>
Nicaragua 2011	<p>With which Political Party do you currently sympathize? Do not read alternatives.</p> <p>(0) None [Go to 4] (1) FSLN (2) PLI (3) PLC (4) ALN (5) APRE (6) Other (specify)</p>	<p>¿Con cuál partido político simpatiza usted actualmente? No leer alternativas</p> <p>(0) Ninguno [Pase a 4] (1) FSLN (2) PLI (3) PLC (4) ALN (5) APRE (6) Otro (mencionar)</p>

		(IF SYMPATHIZES) And would you say that your sympathy for (this party) is...? (READ ALTERNATIVES) (1) Very Weak (2) Weak (3) Neither weak nor strong (4) Strong (5) Very Strong	(SI SIMPATIZA) ¿Y Ud. diría que su simpatía por (ese partido) es...? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS] 1. Muy débil 2. Débil 3. Ni débil /Ni fuerte 4. Fuerte 5. Muy fuerte
Clientelism Exposure	All	<p>The coding of different parties is based on questions on the perceived use of particularistic incentives by parties included in the survey of experts conducted by the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (Kitschelt 2013). Those respondents who identify with a specific party were assigned the average score given by the experts for the party (variable b1), while respondents indicating “other” or minor parties were assigned the average of all other minor parties included in the sample, or if no minor parties were coded, the simple average across all parties coded. Independents were assigned the average level of effort parties and candidates make to use clientelistic inducements in the political system as a whole (variable b6). Specific coding is detailed below.</p> <p><i>Variable b1</i> Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens consumer goods (e.g., food or liquor, clothes, cookware, appliances, medicines, building materials etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing consumer goods? [answered for each party in sample] 1=A negligible effort or none at all 2=A minor effort 3=A moderate effort 4=A major effort</p> <p><i>Variable b6</i> In general, how much effort do politicians and parties in this country make to induce voters with preferential benefits to cast their votes for them? [answered at country level] 1=A negligible effort or none at all 2=A minor effort 3=A moderate effort 4=A major effort</p>	
	Nicaragua 2008	3.5= Does not sympathize/independent 3.5= Sandinista National Liberation Front 3.2= Liberal Constitutional Party 2.44= Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance 3.0466667=Sandinista Renovation Movement 3.0466667=Other	3.5= Does not sympathize/independent 3.5= Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional 3.2= Partido Liberal Constitucionalista 2.44= Alianza Liberal Nicaragüense 3.0466667= Movimiento de Renovación Sandinista 3.0466667= Otro
	México 2009	3.3=Does not sympathize/independent 2.7=PAN 3.75=PRI 3.3499999=PRD 2.4175824=Other	3.3=Does not sympathize/independent 2.7=PAN 3.75=PRI 3.3499999=PRD 2.4175824=Otro
	Honduras 2009	3.1666667.=Does not	3.1666667.=Does not sympathize/independent

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	<p><i>sympathize/independent</i> 3.25=Liberal 3.1666667=Nacional Other=3.2083334</p>	<p>3.25=Liberal 3.1666667=Nacional Otro=3.2083334</p>
Uruguay 2009	<p><i>For Uruguay, the variable is a weighted average based on how close the respondent is to each coded party (see question below)</i></p> <p>2=Colorado Party 2=National Party 1.3333334= Broad Front</p> <p>Independently from whom you voted or thought of voting, how would you say you feel with respect to each of the following parties? Very close, close, neither close nor distant, distant, or very distant? 1. Very close 2. close 3. neither close nor distant 4. distant 5. very distant</p> <p>a. Colorado Party _____ b. National Party _____ c. Broad Front _____</p>	<p><i>For Uruguay, the variable is a weighted average based on how close the respondent is to each coded party (see question below)</i></p> <p>2=Partido Colorado 2=Partido Nacional 1.3333334= Frente Amplio</p> <p>Independientemente de a quién votó o piensa votar, ¿Cómo diría que se siente respecto a los siguientes partidos? ¿Muy cercano, cercano, ni cercano ni lejano, lejano o muy lejano? 1. Muy cercano 2. Cercano 3. Ni cercano, ni lejano 4. Lejano 5. Muy lejano</p> <p>a. Partido Colorado _____ b. Partido Nacional _____ c. Frente Amplio _____</p>
Chile 2009	<p>2.7058823= Does not sympathize/independent 2.3333333= Socialist Party 2.4285715= Party for Democracy 2.5333333= Christian Democrat Party 2.7857144= National Renovation 3.1875= Independent Democratic Union 2.7058823= Other</p>	<p>2.7058823= Does not sympathize/independent 2.3333333= Partido Socialista 2.4285715= Partido por la Democracia 2.5333333= Partido Demócrata Cristiana 2.7857144= Renovación Nacional 3.1875= Unión Demócrata Independiente 2.7058823= Otro</p>
Bolivia 2009	<p>3.6153846= Does not sympathize/independent</p>	<p>3.6153846= Does not sympathize/independent</p>
Bolivia 2010	<p>2.8461537= MAS 3.0769231= PPB-CN 3= UN 3.0769231=MIR 2.9743589= Other</p>	<p>2.8461537= MAS 3.0769231= PPB-CN 3= UN 3.0769231=MIR 2.9743589= Otro</p>
Guatemala 2011	<p>3.4000001= Does not sympathize/independent 3.2222223= National Unity for Hope (une) 3.4444444= Patriotic Party (pp) 3.5555556= Grand National Alliance (gana) 3.1919643= Other</p>	<p>3.4000001= Does not sympathize/independent 3.2222223= unidad nacional de la esperanza (une) 3.4444444= partido patriota (pp) 3.5555556= gran alianza nacional (gana) 3.1919643= otro</p>
Argentina 2011	<p>3.590909= Does not sympathize/independent</p>	<p>3.590909= Does not sympathize/independent</p>

		3.5= Frente para la victoria 3.5454545= Peronismo federal 3.5454545=Partido Justicialista 2.5454545=Unión Cívica Radical 2= PRO 3.0181818=Otro	3.5= Frente para la victoria 3.5454545= Peronismo federal 3.5454545=Partido Justicialista 2.5454545=Unión Cívica Radical 2= PRO 3.0181818=Otro
	Nicaragua 2011	3.5= Does not sympathize/independent 3.5= fsln 2.44= pli 3.2= plc 2.44= aln 3.0466667=Other	3.5= Does not sympathize/independent 3.5= fsln 2.44= pli 3.2= plc 2.44= aln 3.0466667=otro
Prior Voter	All	Abstained=0 Voted=1	
	Nicaragua 2008	-	
	México 2009	For which party did you vote in the 2006 presidential elections? 1) PAN 2) PRI 3) PRD 4) PVEM 5) PT 6) New Alliance 7) Convergence 8) Social Democratic Alternative 9) Annuled vote 10) Did not vote 11) Other (specify) _____	¿Por cuál partido votó en las elecciones presidenciales del año 2006? 1) PAN 2) PRI 3) PRD 4) PVEM 5) PT 6) Nueva Alianza 7) Convergencia 8) Alternativa Socialdemócrata 9) Anuló su voto 10) No votó 11) Otros (esp) _____
	Honduras 2009	And going back further in time, for whom did you vote in the 2005 presidential elections which were won by Mel Zelaya? Or did you not vote? DO NOT READ ALTERNATIVES. 0. Did not vote 1. Pepe Lobo 2. Manuel Zelaya 3. Other: _____	¿Y yendo más atrás en el tiempo, por quién votó en las elecciones presidenciales de 2005, en las que ganó Mel Zelaya? O Ud. no votó? NO LEER ALTERNATIVAS 0. No votó 1. Pepe Lobo 2. Manuel Zelaya 3. Otro: _____
	Uruguay 2009	-	
	Chile 2009	-	
	Bolivia 2009	-	
	Bolivia 2010	And going back further in time, for whom did you vote in the last presidential elections in December 2009? Or did you not vote? 1. Was not registered to vote 2. Registered but did not vote (was sick, traveling...) 3. Evo Morales (MAS) 4. Manfred Reyes (PPB-CN) 5. Samuel Doria (Unidad Nacional)	¿Y yendo unos meses más atrás, por quién votó en las últimas elecciones presidenciales de diciembre 2009? O Ud. no votó? 1. No estaba inscrito para votar 2. Inscrito pero no votó (estaba enfermo, de viaje...) 3. Evo Morales (MAS) 4. Manfred Reyes (PPB-CN) 5. Samuel Doria (Unidad Nacional) 6. René Joaquino (Alianza Social) 7. Otro

		<p>6. René Joaquino (Alianza Social)</p> <p>7. Other _____ (note) _____</p> <p>8. Blank, spoiled ballot</p> <p>9. Not eligible (foreigner)</p>	<p>(Notar): _____</p> <p>8. En blanco, anuló su voto</p> <p>9. No habilitado (extranjero)</p>
Guatemala 2011	<p>And going back further in time, could you tell me for whom did you vote in the first round of the 2007 presidential elections, or did you not vote? [READ ALTERNATIVES]</p> <p>(0) Did not vote</p> <p>(1) Álvaro Colom (UNE)</p> <p>(2) Otto Pérez Molina (PP)</p> <p>(3) Alejandro Giammattei (GANA)</p> <p>(4) Eduardo Suger (CASA)</p> <p>(5) Luis Rabbé (FRG)</p> <p>(6) Mario Estrada (UCN)</p> <p>(7) Rigoberta Menchú (EG)</p> <p>(8) Fritz García-Gallont (PU)</p> <p>(9) Oscar Castañeda (PAN)</p> <p>(11) Other _____</p> <p>(12) Spoiled ballot, voted blank</p> <p>(13) Voted, but don't remember for whom [DO NOT READ]</p>	<p>Y yendo más atrás en el tiempo, podría decirme ¿por quién votó en la primera vuelta de las elecciones presidenciales de 2007, o Usted no votó? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(0) No votó</p> <p>(1) Álvaro Colom (UNE)</p> <p>(2) Otto Pérez Molina (PP)</p> <p>(3) Alejandro Giammattei (GANA)</p> <p>(4) Eduardo Suger (CASA)</p> <p>(5) Luis Rabbé (FRG)</p> <p>(6) Mario Estrada (UCN)</p> <p>(7) Rigoberta Menchú (EG)</p> <p>(8) Fritz García-Gallont (PU)</p> <p>(9) Oscar Castañeda (PAN)</p> <p>(11) Otro _____</p> <p>(12) Votó nulo/en blanco</p> <p>(13) Votó, pero no recuerda por quién [NO LEER]</p>	
Argentina 2011	<p>And going back further in time...for whom did you vote in the 2007 presidential elections, or did you not vote? [READ ALTERNATIVES]</p> <p>(0) Did not vote</p> <p>(1) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner - Frente para la Victoria</p> <p>(2) Elisa Carrió - Coalición Cívica</p> <p>(3) Roberto Lavagna - Concertación para una Nación Avanzada</p> <p>(10) Other _____</p> <p>(11) Spoiled ballot, voted blank</p> <p>(12) Voted, but don't remember for whom (NO LEER)</p>	<p>Yendo más atrás en el tiempo...¿Por quién votó usted en las elecciones presidenciales de 2007, o Usted no votó? [LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <p>(0) No votó</p> <p>(1) Cristina Fernández de Kirchner - Frente para la Victoria</p> <p>(2) Elisa Carrió - Coalición Cívica</p> <p>(3) Roberto Lavagna - Concertación para una Nación Avanzada</p> <p>(10) Otro _____</p> <p>(11) Votó nulo/en blanco</p> <p>(12) Votó pero no recuerda por quién (NO LEER)</p>	
Nicaragua 2011	<p>And for whom did you voted in the 2006 presidential elections?</p> <p>(1) Did not vote</p> <p>(2) Daniel Ortega – FSLN</p> <p>(3) José Rizo – PLC</p> <p>(4) Eduardo Montealegre – ALN</p> <p>(5) Edmundo Jarquín – MRS</p> <p>(6) Edén Pastora – AC</p> <p>(7) Other specify _____</p> <p>(8) Spoiled ballot, voted blank</p> <p>(9) Voted, but don't remember for whom (NO LEER)</p>	<p>¿Y por quién voto en las elecciones presidenciales de 2006?</p> <p>(1) No votó</p> <p>(2) Daniel Ortega – FSLN</p> <p>(3) José Rizo – PLC</p> <p>(4) Eduardo Montealegre – ALN</p> <p>(5) Edmundo Jarquín – MRS</p> <p>(6) Edén Pastora – AC</p> <p>(7) Otro. Mencionar _____</p> <p>(8) Votó nulo/en blanco</p> <p>(9) Votó, pero no recuerda por quién [No leer]</p>	

Gender	Nicaragua 2008	Male=0 Female=1	
	México 2009		
	Honduras 2009		
	Uruguay 2009		
	Chile 2009		
	Bolivia 2009		
	Bolivia 2010		
	Guatemala 2011		
	Argentina 2011		
	Nicaragua 2011		
	All	1=From 18 to 29 2=From 30 to 49 3=50 or more	
Age	Nicaragua 2008	How old are you? 1=From 18 to 29 2=From 30 to 49 3=50 or more	¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? 1=de 18 a 29 2=de 30 a 49 3=de 50 o más
	México 2009	How old are you? _____	¿Qué edad tiene usted? _____
	Honduras 2009	How old are you? 1=From 18 to 29 2=From 30 to 49 3=50 or more	¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? 1=de 18 a 29 2=de 30 a 49 3=de 50 o más
	Uruguay 2009	YEAR OF BIRTH (NOTE) _____	AÑO NACIMIENTO (ANOTAR) _____
	Chile 2009	What is your age? ____ years	. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años
	Bolivia 2009	YEAR OF BIRTH (NOTE): _____	AÑO NACIMIENTO (ANOTAR) _____
	Bolivia 2010		
	Guatemala 2011	What is your age? ____ years	. ¿Cuál es su edad en años cumplidos? _____ años
	Argentina 2011		
	Nicaragua 2011		
Ballot Secrecy	All	0 = Ballot is secret [No] 1 = Ballot is not secret / don't know / no response	
	Nicaragua 2008	Do you think that the government or political parties can find out for whom people in your community voted? Yes=1 No=2	¿Cree Ud. que el gobierno o los partidos pueden descubrir por quien votó alguien en su barrio? Si=1 No=2
	México 2009	Do you think that the government or political parties can find out for whom people in your community voted? Yes=1 No=2	¿Cree Ud. que el gobierno o los partidos pueden descubrir por quien votó alguien en su localidad? Si=1 No=2
	Honduras 2009	Do you believe that the government or parties can discover for whom you voted? 1. Yes 2. No 3. Don't know [DO NOT READ]	¿Cree que el gobierno o los partidos pueden descubrir por quien votó Ud.? 1. Sí 2. No 3. No sé [NO LEER]
	Uruguay 2009		

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	Chile 2009	<p>Do you believe that the government can discover for whom you voted?</p> <p>1. Yes 2. No</p> <p>Do you believe that the government can discover for whom you voted?</p> <p>1. Yes 2. No</p>	<p>¿Cree Ud. que el gobierno puede descubrir por quien votó alguien en su sector?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No</p> <p>¿Y cree Ud. que un partido político o candidato puede descubrir por quien votó alguien en su sector?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No</p>
	Bolivia 2009	<p>Do you think that the government or political parties can find out for whom a person has voted?</p> <p>1. Yes 2. No</p>	<p>¿Cree que el gobierno o los partidos pueden descubrir por quién votó una persona?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No</p>
	Bolivia 2010	<p>1. Yes 2. No</p>	
	Guatemala 2011	<p>Do you believe that the government or the parties can discover for whom you have voted?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No</p>	<p>¿Cree que el gobierno o los partidos pueden descubrir por quién votó Usted?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No</p>
	Argentina 2011	<p>[IF R VOTED] Do you believe that the government or the parties can know for whom you voted?</p> <p>[IF R DID NOT VOTE] If you had voted, do you believe that the government or the parties could know for whom you voted?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No</p>	<p>[SI VOTO] ¿Cree que el gobierno o los partidos pueden saber por quién votó Usted?</p> <p>[SI NO VOTO] En el caso que hubiera votado, ¿cree que el gobierno o los partidos podrían saber como votó Ud.?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No</p>
	Nicaragua 2011	<p>[If R voted in November 2011] Returning to the November elections, do you think that the government or parties can discover for whom you voted?</p> <p>[If R did not vote in November 2011] Returning to the November elections, do you believe that if you had voted, the government or the parties could discover for whom you voted?</p> <p>(1) Yes (2) No</p>	<p>[Si votó en noviembre 2011] Volviendo a las elecciones de noviembre, ¿cree usted que el gobierno o los partidos pueden descubrir por quién votó?</p> <p>[Si no votó en noviembre 2011] Volviendo a las elecciones de noviembre, ¿cree usted que si hubiera votado, el gobierno o los partidos podrían descubrir por quién votó?</p> <p>(1) Sí (2) No</p>
	All	The scale for the reciprocity variable was inverted such that strongly agree=3 and do not agree at all/strongly disagree was coded 0.	
Reciprocity	Nicaragua 2008	-	-
	México 2009	-	-
	Honduras 2009	<p>Could you tell me how much you agree with the following phrase?</p>	<p>Podría decirme cuan de acuerdo está Ud. con la siguiente frase?</p>

		<p>"When someone does me a favor, I feel obligated to return the favor"</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Strongly agree 2. Somewhat agree 3. Don't agree 4. Do not agree at all 	<p>"Cuando alguien me hace un favor, me siento obligado a devolver ese favor"</p> <p>1=Muy de acuerdo 2=Algo de acuerdo 3= Poco de acuerdo 4= Nada de acuerdo</p>
	Uruguay 2009	-	-
	Chile 2009	-	-
	Bolivia 2009	-	-
	Bolivia 2010	-	-
	Guatemala 2011	<p>Could you tell me how much you agree with the following phrase? "When someone does me a favor, I feel obligated to return the favor?" Do you...[READ ALTERNATIVES]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Strongly disagree (2) Somewhat disagree (3) Somewhat agree (4) Strongly agree 	<p>Podría decirme cuán de acuerdo está Ud. con la siguiente frase? "Cuando alguien me hace un favor, me siento obligado a devolver ese favor." Está...[LEER ALTERNATIVAS]</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Muy en desacuerdo (2) En desacuerdo (3) Algo de acuerdo (4) Muy de acuerdo
	Argentina 2011		
	Nicaragua 2011		

TABLE B2: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

VARIABLE	COUNTRY STUDY	N	MN	MAX	MEAN	SD
List Experiment	Nicaragua 2008	995	0	5	2.19	1.14
	México 2009	1183	0	4	1.08	0.88
	Honduras 2009	993	0	5	2.18	1.01
	Uruguay 2009	857	0	4	1.86	0.79
	Chile 2009	1882	0	5	1.58	1.21
	Bolivia 2009	2063	0	5	1.26	1.05
	Bolivia 2010	2086	0	5	0.95	0.89
	Guatemala 2011	500	0	4	1.32	0.90
	Argentina 2011	751	0	4	0.90	0.63
	Nicaragua 2011	1987	0	4	1.12	0.85
Treatment list assignment	Nicaragua 2008	1008	0	1	0.50	0.50
	México 2009	1250	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Honduras 2009	1008	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Uruguay 2009	900	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Chile 2009	1882	0	1	0.49	0.50
	Bolivia 2009	2143	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Bolivia 2010	2149	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Guatemala 2011	504	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Argentina 2011	754	0	1	0.48	0.50
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	0	1	0.49	0.50
Direct Vote Buying	Nicaragua 2008	1003	0	1	0.02	0.15
	México 2009	1246	0	1	0.09	0.28
	Honduras 2009	1005	0	1	0.04	0.19
	Uruguay 2009	880	0	1	0.01	0.08
	Chile 2009	1941	0	1	0.05	0.23
	Bolivia 2009	2099	0	1	0.05	0.21
	Bolivia 2010	2097	0	1	0.07	0.26
	Guatemala 2011	503	0	1	0.04	0.19
	Argentina 2011	751	0	1	0.01	0.10
	Nicaragua 2011	1999	0	1	0.01	0.10
Education	Nicaragua 2008	1008	1	3	1.71	0.70
	México 2009	1250	1	3	2.08	0.77
	Honduras 2009	1008	1	3	1.52	0.65
	Uruguay 2009	899	1	3	1.77	0.70
	Chile 2009	1962	1	3	2.01	0.73
	Bolivia 2009	2143	1	3	1.93	0.80
	Bolivia 2010	2149	1	3	1.93	0.84
	Guatemala 2011	504	1	3	1.48	0.63
	Argentina 2011	754	1	3	1.71	0.80
	Nicaragua 2011	2004	1	3	1.96	0.78
Income/ SES (standardized)	Nicaragua 2008	1008	1.03	14.24	0.00	0.96
	México 2009	1250	1.51	2.26	0.00	0.89
	Honduras 2009	1008	0.56	10.19	0.00	0.99
	Uruguay 2009	900	1.92	3.88	0.00	0.90
	Chile 2009	1965	1.76	1.94	0.00	0.92
	Bolivia 2009	2143	1.57	2.75	0.00	1.00
	Bolivia 2010	2149	1.56	2.72	0.00	1.00
	Guatemala 2011	502	1.19	5.74	0.00	0.98
	Argentina 2011	754	2.25	2.66	0.00	0.76
	Nicaragua 2011	2000	0.99	16.52	0.00	0.95

Income No Answer	Nicaragua 2008	1008	0	1	0.07	0.25
	México 2009	1250	0	1	0.21	0.41
	Honduras 2009	1008	0	1	0.02	0.13
	Uruguay 2009	900	0	1	0.18	0.39
	Chile 2009	1965	0	1	0.15	0.35
	Bolivia 2009
	Bolivia 2010
	Guatemala 2011	504	0	1	0.03	0.17
	Argentina 2011	754	0	1	0.42	0.49
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	0	1	0.10	0.30
Partisan Strength	Nicaragua 2008	1008	0	1.5	0.94	0.73
	México 2009	1250	0	2	1.02	0.83
	Honduras 2009	1008	0	2	1.39	0.77
	Uruguay 2009	900	0	2	1.08	0.80
	Chile 2009	1965	0	1.5	0.19	0.50
	Bolivia 2009	2143	0	2	0.85	0.86
	Bolivia 2010	2149	0	2	0.71	0.83
	Guatemala 2011	504	0	2	0.97	0.86
	Argentina 2011	754	0	2	0.60	0.82
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	0	2	1.25	0.85
Clientelism Exposure	Nicaragua 2008	1008	2.44	3.50	3.42	0.16
	México 2009	1250	2.42	3.75	3.29	0.42
	Honduras 2009	1008	3.17	3.25	3.20	0.04
	Uruguay 2009	900	1.52	1.94	1.71	0.12
	Chile 2009	1965	2.33	3.19	2.70	0.08
	Bolivia 2009	2143	2.85	3.62	3.22	0.36
	Bolivia 2010	2149	2.85	3.62	3.25	0.36
	Guatemala 2011	504	3.19	3.44	3.36	0.10
	Argentina 2011	754	2.00	3.59	3.46	0.34
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	2.44	3.50	3.28	0.41
Prior Voter	All
	Nicaragua 2008
	México 2009	1250	0	1	0.73	0.45
	Honduras 2009	1008	0	1	0.67	0.47
	Uruguay 2009	0
	Chile 2009	0
	Bolivia 2009	0
	Bolivia 2010	2149	0	1	0.71	0.45
	Guatemala 2011	504	0	1	0.63	0.48
	Argentina 2011	754	0	1	0.76	0.43
Nicaragua 2011	2005	0	1	0.61	0.49	
Gender	Nicaragua 2008	1008	0	1	0.50	0.50
	México 2009	1250	0	1	0.54	0.50
	Honduras 2009	1008	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Uruguay 2009	900	0	1	0.55	0.50
	Chile 2009	1965	0	1	0.51	0.50
	Bolivia 2009	2143	0	1	0.52	0.50
	Bolivia 2010	2149	0	1	0.50	0.50
	Guatemala 2011	504	0	1	0.51	0.50
	Argentina 2011	754	0	1	0.54	0.50
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	0	1	0.51	0.50

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Age	Nicaragua 2008	1008	1	3	1.89	0.77
	México 2009	1250	1	3	2.14	0.77
	Honduras 2009	1008	1	3	1.98	0.79
	Uruguay 2009	900	1	3	2.18	0.79
	Chile 2009	1965	1	3	2.09	0.77
	Bolivia 2009	2143	1	3	1.77	0.76
	Bolivia 2010	2149	1	3	1.75	0.75
	Guatemala 2011	504	1	3	1.85	0.76
	Argentina 2011	754	1	3	2.05	0.80
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	1	3	1.73	0.76
Ballot Secrecy	Nicaragua 2008	1008	0	1	0.45	0.50
	México 2009	1250	0	1	0.37	0.48
	Honduras 2009	1008	0	1	0.57	0.49
	Uruguay 2009	900	0	1	0.49	0.50
	Chile 2009	1965	0	1	0.31	0.46
	Bolivia 2009	2143	0	1	0.27	0.44
	Bolivia 2010	2149	0	1	0.33	0.47
	Guatemala 2011	504	0	1	0.26	0.44
	Argentina 2011	754	0	1	0.26	0.44
	Nicaragua 2011	2005	0	1	0.23	0.42
Reciprocity	Nicaragua 2008
	México 2009
	Honduras 2009	1008	1	4	2.12	1.20
	Uruguay 2009
	Chile 2009
	Bolivia 2009
	Bolivia 2010
	Guatemala 2011	489	1	4	2.38	1.17
	Argentina 2011	733	1	4	2.42	1.05
	Nicaragua 2011	2000	0	3	1.44	1.02

Appendix C: Statistical Tables

TABLE CI: PREDICTING ANSWERS TO DIRECT VOTE BUYING QUESTION, LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS

	NICARAGUA '08	MEXICO '09	HONDURAS '09	URUGUAY '09	CHILE '09
Gender	-0.29 (0.43)	-0.04 (0.22)	0.25 (0.35)	1.35 (1.04)	0.76** (0.26)
Age	-0.24 (0.25)	-0.04 (0.12)	0.06 (0.19)	-0.49 (0.46)	-0.23+ (0.12)
Education	-0.51 (0.45)	0.35+ (0.18)	-0.44 (0.35)	0.07 (0.64)	-0.06 (0.20)
Income/SES	-0.33 (0.51)	0.13 (0.13)	-0.76 (0.72)	0.26 (0.48)	0.08 (0.15)
Income NA		-0.44 (0.31)	0.54 (1.07)	1.26 (0.96)	0.06 (0.32)
PID Strength	0.90* (0.38)	0.40** (0.14)	0.28 (0.27)	0.74 (0.86)	0.29 (0.24)
Clientelism Exposure	5.10* (2.51)	0.46+ (0.27)	-0.64 (4.27)	-2.87 (2.12)	0.88 (1.15)
Ballot Secrecy	-0.43 (0.46)	0.91** (0.22)	0.03 (0.34)	0.76 (1.07)	0.61** (0.23)
Reciprocity			0.30* (0.14)		
Prior Voter		0.39 (0.29)	-0.26 (0.44)		
Constant	-4.08** (0.30)	-2.58** (0.13)	-3.48** (0.24)	-5.99** (0.77)	-2.98** (0.13)
N	933	1246	1005	879	1939

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

TABLE CI: PREDICTING ANSWERS TO DIRECT VOTE BUYING QUESTION, LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS, CONTINUED

	BOLIVIA '09	BOLIVIA '10	GUATEMALA '11	ARGENTINA '11	NICARAGUA '11
Gender	0.07 (0.26)	0.11 (0.25)	0.84 (0.58)	0.86 (0.99)	-2.03* (1.03)
Age	-0.21 (0.15)	-0.15 (0.13)	-0.30 (0.37)	-0.71** (0.26)	-1.07* (0.54)
Education	-0.83** (0.19)	-0.09 (0.17)	-0.09 (0.57)	-0.42 (0.37)	-1.24** (0.48)
Income/SES	0.71** (0.15)	-0.35* (0.17)	-0.12 (0.28)	-0.84** (0.26)	0.30 (0.35)
Income NA			1.51 (1.14)	0.19 (0.80)	-1.44 (1.36)
PID Strength	0.13 (0.27)	0.55+ (0.31)	0.25 (0.29)	0.78+ (0.41)	0.02 (0.28)
Clientelism Exposure	-1.27+ (0.69)	0.19 (0.68)	2.65 (3.06)	0.15 (0.57)	2.12+ (1.17)
Ballot Secrecy	0.06 (0.27)	0.09 (0.26)	0.13 (0.60)	-2.53* (1.20)	2.29* (1.06)
Reciprocity			0.76** (0.23)	0.87* (0.44)	1.36** (0.48)
Prior Voter		-0.50 (0.32)	0.11 (0.51)	2.33+ (1.26)	1.28 (0.98)
Constant	-3.28** (0.14)	-2.69** (0.13)	-3.88** (0.36)	-6.16** (0.95)	-7.13** (0.81)
N	2099	2097	488	731	1988

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

TABLE C2: PREDICTING ANSWERS TO VOTE BUYING LIST EXPERIMENT QUESTION, OLS REGRESSIONS

	NICARAGUA '08	MEXICO '09	HONDURAS '09	URUGUAY '09	CHILE '09
<i>Treatment List</i>					
Gender	0.18 (0.14)	0.10 (0.11)	-0.15 (0.13)	0.02 (0.11)	0.18 (0.13)
Age	0.15* (0.08)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.05 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.06 (0.06)
Education	0.19+ (0.11)	0.17* (0.08)	-0.00 (0.10)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.08 (0.10)
Income/SES	-0.07 (0.07)	-0.08 (0.06)	0.13* (0.06)	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.02 (0.08)
Income NA	0.27 (0.27)	0.13 (0.13)	-0.31 (0.42)	0.11 (0.13)	0.15 (0.18)
PID Strength	0.01 (0.11)	-0.09 (0.07)	0.22** (0.09)	-0.12+ (0.07)	0.02 (0.12)
Clientelism Exposure	0.13 (0.45)	-0.03 (0.13)	-0.20 (1.56)	-0.18 (0.47)	-1.14+ (0.59)
Ballot Secrecy	0.38** (0.14)	0.07 (0.11)	-0.01 (0.13)	-0.12 (0.11)	0.16 (0.14)
Reciprocity			-0.03 (0.05)		
Prior Voter		0.12 (0.13)	0.19 (0.15)		
Treat Constant	0.25** (0.07)	0.23** (0.05)	0.22** (0.06)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.06)
<i>Control List</i>					
Gender	0.05 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.08)	-0.17* (0.08)
Age	-0.08+ (0.05)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.02 (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.08+ (0.04)
Education	0.00 (0.07)	-0.01 (0.06)	0.08 (0.07)	0.04 (0.06)	0.13+ (0.07)
Income/SES	0.06 (0.06)	0.11** (0.04)	-0.09* (0.04)	0.06 (0.05)	0.03 (0.05)
Income NA	-0.33+ (0.18)	-0.07 (0.09)	0.50** (0.19)	-0.11 (0.10)	-0.51** (0.12)
PID Strength	0.09 (0.07)	0.09+ (0.05)	0.13* (0.06)	0.06 (0.05)	0.14+ (0.08)
Clientelism Exposure	-0.02 (0.34)	0.06 (0.09)	-0.49 (1.12)	-0.18 (0.35)	1.23** (0.43)
Ballot Secrecy	-0.25** (0.09)	0.03 (0.08)	0.19* (0.09)	0.01 (0.08)	0.08 (0.09)
Reciprocity			-0.01 (0.04)		
Prior Voter		-0.17* (0.09)	0.08 (0.10)		
Control Constant	2.05**	0.98**	2.06**	1.87**	1.56**

	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	995	1183	993	856	1880

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

TABLE C I : PREDICTING ANSWERS TO VOTE BUYING LIST EXPERIMENT QUESTION, OLS REGRESSIONS, CONTINUED

	BOLIVIA '09	BOLIVIA '10	GUATEMALA '11	ARGENTINA '11	NICARAGUA '11
<i>Treatment List</i>					
Gender	-0.00 (0.11)	0.08 (0.09)	0.11 (0.16)	-0.13 (0.11)	-0.14 (0.10)
Age	-0.12+ (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.01 (0.09)	-0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.06)
Education	-0.12 (0.09)	-0.01 (0.07)	0.04 (0.15)	-0.10 (0.08)	0.20** (0.07)
Income/SES	0.08 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)	0.04 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.16** (0.06)
Income NA			-0.19 (0.43)	0.09 (0.12)	0.21 (0.16)
PID Strength	-0.01 (0.16)	0.27* (0.11)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.04 (0.07)	-0.03 (0.06)
Clientelism Exposure	-0.27 (0.38)	0.33 (0.26)	0.40 (0.80)	-0.13 (0.20)	0.03 (0.12)
Ballot Secrecy	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.01 (0.10)	-0.30 (0.19)	-0.22+ (0.13)	0.03 (0.12)
Reciprocity			0.13+ (0.07)	-0.05 (0.05)	0.02 (0.05)
Prior Voter		-0.08 (0.10)	-0.02 (0.18)	0.07 (0.14)	0.01 (0.12)
Treat Constant	0.06 (0.06)	0.00 (0.05)	0.15+ (0.08)	0.06 (0.06)	0.08 (0.05)
<i>Control List</i>					
Gender	-0.00 (0.07)	0.01 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.11)	0.06 (0.07)	0.01 (0.07)
Age	-0.00 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.06)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.01 (0.04)
Education	0.24** (0.06)	0.12** (0.05)	0.04 (0.11)	0.16** (0.06)	0.04 (0.05)
Income/SES	0.13* (0.05)	0.01 (0.04)	0.06 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.05)	0.09* (0.04)
Income NA			0.14 (0.36)	-0.10 (0.08)	-0.25* (0.10)
PID Strength	-0.04 (0.09)	0.00 (0.07)	0.13* (0.07)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.13** (0.04)
Clientelism Exposure	-0.43+ (0.13)	-0.08 (0.10)	-0.42 (0.19)	0.11 (0.13)	0.09 (0.12)

	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.56)	(0.13)	(0.09)
Ballot Secrecy	0.20*	0.08	0.15	0.17*	-0.03
	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Reciprocity			-0.22**	0.01	-0.02
			(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Prior Voter		0.07	0.11	-0.07	0.02
		(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.10)	(0.08)
Control Constant	1.23**	0.94**	1.24**	0.87**	1.08**
	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)
N	2063	2086	485	730	1976

+ p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01

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